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Preface
History is often an admittedly bleak subject. When historians do their work best, they try to
find a retrospective justice for an unjust past. Even as citizens of the present, we comfort ourselves
with the knowledge that the powerful and corrupt today cannot escape the judgement of history
tomorrow. In the course of this project, I have found every reason to believe this is often not true,
that history reflects the biases of power more than it challenges them. Additionally, there is a kind of
separateness to the past a historian sees which oftentimes softens their judgemental blows. Trouillot
notes this when he writes that “The more historians wrote about past worlds, the more The Past
became real as a separate world.”1 The trouble is that the past is not a separate world. We live in a
world built on the past and which, with every second, slips deeper into it. Walter Benjamin noted
that history’s site “is not homogenous, empty time, but time filled by the presence of the now.”2 If
we, as historians, treat history as empty time we not only drive ourselves into irrelevance, but we
ignore the presence in the past.
Given this, it is right that we judge the past not only as historians, but as ordinary people.
When figures such as my subjects, Jefferson, Madison, and Monroe, are raised to a pedestal which
no judgement seems to shrink, historians cannot fight this by further entrenching the past as a
separate world. Our judgement of these figures should not only be intelligent and considered, but
humorous and demythologizing. These are daily figures in our lives, whether we like it or not, and
we should treat them as such, with all the expectations and vernacular we would direct against
figures of the present. Just as some poor and embittered Virginian sitting in a pub would curse them,
so should we. They were, in no uncertain terms, greedy bastards, and we live in the world they created.
To understand our world, we cannot live in a world of ‘great but deeply flawed visionaries’
or ‘enlightened but imperfect revolutionaries’ or even a world of ‘founding fathers.’ To understand
our world and grapple with our past, we need to live in a world of greedy bastards. This is not only
because they were bastards, but because the bastards of our present gain their legitimacy from those
of our past. The bite of judgement on past and present oppressors is softened by any mention of
‘visionaries,’ ‘revolutionaries,’ or ‘fathers.’ Historians love complexity, but for figures such as these
there are no mixed legacies, for any positives will almost always be taken as outweighing the
negatives. This does not mean historians need to take up their hatchets at the cost of ignoring the
past, but it does mean they should not be timid in judgement because these bastards were not timid
in their crimes.
Perhaps one day children will open their textbooks to the ‘Greedy Bastards’ section. On that
day the tables will have turned and an admirable lens on these individuals will go against the grain,
but until then we have a duty to push against the narrative of the powerful that continues to
structure our world. Given that history is all that remains of us after we die, I think the best world
we can create is one where the powerful live their lives in fear of being remembered as greedy
bastards. This is the presence in the past and we must fight to make it just.

Michel-Rolph Trouillot, Silencing the Past: Power and the Production of History (Boston: Beacon Press, 1995), 152.
Walter Benjamin, “Theses on the Philosophy of History,” in Illuminations, ed. Hannah Arendt, trans. Harry Zohn, (New
York: Schocken Books, 1968), 261.
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1
Introduction-Condemn the Bastards
“Silences are inherent in history because any single event enters history with some of its constituting parts
missing. Something is always left out while something else is recorded….In other words, the very mechanisms that
make any historical recording possible also ensure that historical facts are not created equal.”3
-Michel-Rolph Trouillot
If Trouillot is right, as I believe he is, then just as single events enter history with pieces
missing, some events undergo a breadth of historical investigation in comparison to others, which
are consigned to the purgatory of the unimportant. When scholars look at the ‘founding fathers’ and
their relationships with republican projects outside the United States, they focus predominantly on
the trans-Atlantic exchange between the United States and revolutionary France.4 This focus is partly
structural: these figures routinely travelled to France, exchanged letters with a variety of French
notables,5 and in their own writing portrayed the early period of the French revolution as a glorious
continuation of their own republican moment. While these are understandable reasons, they also
lead history to mimic the biases of its subjects. We see the importance of republican France like the
founding fathers saw it. Or maybe, we see history like the founding fathers wanted us to see it. In
short, this historical focus is a silence like any other silence. Something is left out and something else
is recorded.
Left out are the revolutions which shaped the American world and, in previously overlooked
ways, the very idea of republican government. While the old-world revolution in France played to
the founding fathers’ hopes—that the ‘enlightenment’ they discovered could spread across the ocean
to their ancestral continent—its failure sparked new-world revolutions that challenged their

Michel-Rolph Trouillot, Silencing the Past: Power and the Production of History (Boston: Beacon Press, 1995), 49.
Although there has been work to diversify this focus. Brandon Mills’ “‘The United States of Africa’: Liberian
Independence and the Contested Meaning of a Black Republic” is one example.
5
Indeed, even when shifting one’s historical focus, one often has to rely on these same letters as, despite my shift to
Latin America, I rely on letters to Lafayette and Roland.
3
4
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ideology. Napoleon’s invasion of the Iberian peninsula and the resulting collapse of the previously
effective Spanish colonial system led to a wave of Latin American revolutions for both
independence and, in many cases, representative government. The French revolution had, years
earlier, been a far away cause for everyday Americans, but these new revolutions occurred in their
own hemisphere and, as a result, shared many of the same challenges. Beyond the combination of
independence and representative government,6 Latin American revolutionaries faced a similar
context to that of the United States because they possessed a colonial history, an active slave
economy, populations that were indigenous, African, and European, and lived next to large swaths
of land that were often seen as ‘free’ for expansion. When the founding fathers looked East, they
saw a European revolution but when they looked South they were confronted with an American
one. These situational similarities drive one shift of this project, away from an investigation of the
founding fathers’ reactions to the French revolution toward an investigation of their thoughts on
Latin American revolutions.7
This shift drives this project largely because of one letter. Writing to Alexander Von
Humboldt in 1814, Jefferson discussed what he thought about the prospects for republicanism in
Latin America and the shape of the American hemisphere he hoped would emerge from this
moment. Already interested in the later-life retrospective thoughts of founding figures on the
governments they created, this letter was striking because Jefferson was not only implicitly
expounding on his earlier ideas about the meaning of republicanism, but was engaging with its future

6

A combination which, in and of itself, merits the hemispheric investigation.
As such, while scholars such as Patrice Higonnet in Sister Republics: the Origins of French and American Republicanism, James
Kloppenberg in Toward Democracy, and Susan Dunn in S ister Revolutions: French Lightning, American Light have focused on
the trans-Atlantic republican interaction, and while this project draws on the founders’ experience with the French
Revolution in order to better contextualize their views on Latin America, this East-West dialogue is not the focus of this
project.
7
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outside of his direct control. The letter, not prominently cited in most analyses of Jefferson’s
thought, shifted my focus to the moment of Latin American revolution. In effect, it showed me a
silence which hid not only a significant historical moment, but a potential reconceptualization of
republicanism itself.
However, this is not the only silence this project attempts to confront. The American
mythology exerts a great deal of power over the historiographic process, particularly the mythology
surrounding the ‘founding moment.’ In this historical rendering, the 1787 constitutional convention
was a moment of ‘pure creation’ in which not only was the structure of the U.S. government created,
but so too were the core tenets of U.S. republicanism in connection, of course, to the Declaration of
Independence.8 Although the United States would evolve over time, this core ideology would remain
set in stone. This historical interpretation ignores a critical fact: those founders proceeded to govern
the United States for the next thirty eight years. When history creates such a clear line between the
founding and the early republic, it facilitates an overly rosy picture of U.S. republicanism by
restricting its view only to doctrinal republicanism—the version put forward in words by the
founders—which leads to ignorance of republicanism as an implemented practice and theory of rule.
In essence, this periodic division treats the founders only as republican thinkers, when in fact they
translated those thoughts into action and, in so doing, continued to expand, retract, and cement
their republican ideology. To understand the true nature of U.S. republicanism, the period that
counts as ‘the founding’ must be extended. As Gordon Wood notes, this early republican period is
too often silenced by the founding that preceded it and the early national period that came after it.9

8

Scholars that focus on this founding moment and the conceptual origins of republicanism include Gordon Wood
(especially his book The Creation of the American Republic) and J.G.A. Pockock. This project, however, focuses on the post
1800 period in order to understand this republicanism better by investigating its realization through action.
9
Gordon Wood, “The Significance of the Early Republic,” Journal of the Early Republic 8, no. 1 (1988): 5.
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In fact, this early republican period not only further defined the republican ideology, but, even more
importantly, defined it in the post-1815 moment where the U.S. was no longer a recently-liberated
colony. What this republicanism meant to its founders when it was combined with the growth of
U.S. power is a crucial question. In the moment of Latin American revolution we not only see the
question of republicanism, but also the question of what an increasingly influential United States
would do about it? Hence, the focal puzzle of this project surrounds what the founding fathers
thought about the potential for representative government10 in Latin America. What new picture of
U.S. republicanism emerges when the investigative lens is shifted to focus on this North-South
republican dialogue in the early republican period?
In answering this question, this project draws heavily on historians writing broader histories,
namely Arthur Whitaker and his The United States and the Independence of Latin America 1800-1830.
Although these works provide many of the facts this project will draw on, its focus will be much
more narrow and its interpretive position will differ from many of these authors. Similarly, the
diplomatic history of this period11 is relevant context for this project because the founders were
situated in a world rife with diplomatic concerns and many of these concerns influenced their views
on Latin American republicanism. This project, however, shifts the focus onto how this diplomacy
was relevant to their imaginations of representative government in Latin America, rather than
focusing on the diplomacy itself. For example, Stephen Chambers’ book No God But Gain: The Untold

10

A quick note: the term “republicanism” has been much debated in political science literature but in this project it will
be largely used to denote a government structured around the election of representative leaders, interchangeable with
“representative government.” In this schema, republicanism also denotes a system in which the public good is prioritized
over the private interest. This is to mirror the founders’ own usage.
11
Including, but not limited to: James Lewis-The American Union and the Problem of Neighborhood, Don Coerver and Linda
Hall-Tangled Destinies: Latin America and the United States, Charles Griffin-The United States and the Disruption of the Spanish
Empire 1810-1822, Alonso Aguilar-Pan-Americanism from Monroe to the Present, Harry Bernstein-Origins of Inter-American
Interest 1700-1812, Jay Sexton-The Monroe Doctrine:Empire and Nation in Nineteenth Century America, and a variety of other
works.
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Story of Cuban Slavery, the Monroe Doctrine, and the Making of the United States provides a useful historical
retelling of the Monroe Doctrine but does not discuss the connection between this doctrine and
republicanism, which is the focus of this project. The investigation of political culture by historians
like Caitlin Fitz in her Our Sister Republics is critical for understanding the period, but this project
focuses on the founders themselves due to their position in the national mythology and their
connection to the ‘principles’ of the United States. In the same way, a great deal of scholarship looks
into the the positions of U.S. politicians on the question of Latin American independence and
representative government, however much of this literature focuses on figures who were not central
to the founding of the U.S. republic, such as Henry Clay and John Quincy Adams. Although
important figures in the history of this period, this project focuses on the founding fathers
themselves in order to question the fundamental vision of U.S. republicanism.
This focus is limited to Jefferson, Madison, and Monroe for a variety of reasons. Holding
power from the very start of the revolutions until their general success, these persons had the
greatest ability to engage with the questions these revolutions raised. Additionally, given that
Jefferson exited office as these revolutions were just getting of the ground, the general
correspondence between these individuals even after their retirements provides a crucial area of
investigation. These figures were a part of the same social class of Virginia Plantation owners, they
all owned slaves, they were close friends and mentors to each other, and, perhaps because of these
factors and as this project will show, they were engaged in a collective twenty four year project to
define the future of the United States.12 Finally, these were some of the figures most integral to the
formation of the U.S. republican identity and the American creedal narrative.13
12

When I refer to the “Virginia Dynasty,” I refer to these three individuals.
This is the case because Jefferson’s Declaration of Independence, Madison’s influence over the constitutional design,
and Monroe’s Doctrine and its influence provide the foundations for this version of history.
13
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This creedal narrative is precisely what this project seeks to push against, following in the
footsteps of scholars such as Aziz Rana. Rana writes that as a consequence of understanding the
United States in “civic rather than white settler terms”14 “today’s vision of the country as
intrinsically—if incompletely—liberal systemically deemphasizes those forms of economic and
political subordination that continue to mark the experience of historically marginalized
communities.”15 He labels this “anticolonial, liberatory, and egalitarian” story the “American creedal
narrative.”16 This narrative smooths over various aspects of history as ‘imperfections’ in an
otherwise pure ideology17 and remains pervasive throughout historical writing. Gunnar Myrdal and
his An American Dilemma helped codify the concept and scholars such as James Kloppenberg in his
Toward Democracy further it. Outside the academy, the narrative may be found in the speeches and
writings of President Obama in addition to most U.S. history textbooks. This influence is
unfortunate because, as Trouillot would say, this narrative silences and it is this silence that this
project attempts to confront. What story emerges when we stop engaging in this creedal narrative
and search for a new view of United States history?
This story is found through the connection with Latin America. While the creedal narrative
holds the universality of republicanism as a core tenet, the approaches of Jefferson, Madison, and
Monroe to the Latin American revolutions of independence reveal that this tenet was, rather than
imperfectly applied, nonexistent. Instead of this universality guiding a robust support of Latin
American republicanism, this ‘universal’ republicanism was itself structured around the self-interest

Allegra McLeod, “Police Violence, Constitutional Complicity, and Another Vantage,” The Supreme Court Review 2016,
no. 1 (2017): 182.
15
Aziz Rana, “Colonialism and Constitutional Memory,” UC Irvine Law Review 5, no. 2 (2015): 268.
16
Allegra McLeod, “Police Violence, Constitutional Complicity, and Another Vantage,” The Supreme Court Review 2016,
no. 1 (2017): 182.
17
For example, the existence of slavery and its inequalities were an aberration from the founding egalitarian philosophy,
rather than that philosophy having inequalities written into its core.
14
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of the United States and especially around the Virginia Dynasty’s collective project of U.S. territorial
expansion. This expansionist project is addressed most directly in the third chapter, in which the
creation and rationale of the Monroe Doctrine are analyzed. However, before putting forward his
doctrine Monroe wrote to Thomas Jefferson and James Madison to ask their advice and so in order
to fully connect the Monroe Doctrine to the conception of republicanism that undergirds it, the
thoughts of both these figures on Latin American revolutions are analyzed in the first two chapters
of this project. These chapters are unified by an approach that places diverse letters across many
years in conversation so that a picture of the later-life republican vision of these figures may be
developed. Given the nature of these letters, a synthetic approach is required to contextualize and
extrapolate this picture from the varied and oftentimes elusive references to Latin American
revolutions. This picture was translated into action in the Monroe Doctrine, and so the letters and
the doctrine reflect on each other and both contribute to the continued evolution of the meaning of
founding republicanism. This historical moment is used to critique the American creedal narrative.
Rather than utilizing that moment to support the republican cause, the previously revealed
preference for a self-interested, slave based, and territorially expansive vision of republicanism is
realized in this foundational moment of foreign policy. This realization is then connected to the
American project more broadly. With its core largely centered around self-interested territorial
expansion, and with the actions of the founders surrounding republican Latin America centering
around the same, the American creedal narrative is firmly called into question.
Ironically, to disprove the creedal narrative you must first reject it. This is why silences are so
insidious: you do not find them unless you are looking but once you see them, they are everywhere.
Aziz Rana’s critique of the creedal narrative was highlighted in a Supreme Court Law Review
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because the constitutionalism and the constitutional originalism that guide the court are founded on
this creedal narrative. Open up any history textbook about the United States, and odds are one will
find the creedal narrative and the silences that come with it. Stories of U.S. support for France will
abound while the foundations for two centuries of U.S. exploitation in Latin America will remain
absent. This creedal narrative forms the basis for the U.S. political system and its national
mythology. While each disturbing fact about a founding father is levied against this narrative, they
are often not placed within a narrative whole. Trouillot writes that his project of unearthing
“required extra labor not so much in the production of new facts but in their transformation into a
new narrative.”18 This project attempts to take already-found letters and use them to weave a new
American narrative.
This new narrative offers several contributions. First, it highlights the early foundations for
U.S. imperialism in Latin America. This narrative also deepens the analysis of other scholars about
the centrality of slavery and territorial expansion to the identity and history of the United States.
Additionally, this project critiques the apotheosis of these figures in American political culture.
Finally, the core mythology of the United States is challenged and the implications of this for future
historical work are extrapolated. At stake is no less than our sense of what the United States means,
what stories we tell our children,19 and how we think about our collective responsibility.
This responsibility is at the heart of my interest in this topic. Growing up in the midst of
domestic and international crises, some existential in character, the world seemed hopeless. As a
younger person, I thought the problem was one of generational differences; I now know that it is
more complicated. Our country is built on myths. This is what Ernest Renan meant when he said
Michel-Rolph Trouillot, Silencing the Past: Power and the Production of History (Boston: Beacon Press, 1995), 58.
Rogers Smith, Stories of Peoplehood: The Politics and Morals of Political Membership (Cambridge: The Cambridge University
Press, 2003)
18
19
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that “Getting history wrong is part of being a nation.”20 But these myths have led us astray. How we
have been getting history wrong makes us believe that this country is built upon principles rather
than selfishness, egalitarianism rather than exploitation, cosmopolitanism rather than imperialism.
We are now in a moment when, as the oppressive legacies of our history have gained more potency,
these disconnects have matured into social rifts and, should we continue to hold on to the myths of
our forebears, they will tear us apart. To build a new world we need a new story, and in my mind it is
better that this story be truth rather than myth.
The truth is that the men who founded the United States were arrogant, selfish, greedy
bastards. Where they saw the opportunity for gain, they took it and structured their principles to
justify their actions. These principles are core to our old mythology, and their infallibility must be
torn down if we are to have new stories and, through them, a new world. This moment of Latin
American revolutions, of Monroe and his doctrine, of an extended founding, is one in which this
truth can be highlighted. As long as we look to these bastards with pride, none of our issues can
truly be solved. Their history is one we should be ashamed of, which is good not because of its
existence, but because this shame might motivate us to make right the harms of our past. Pride in
these ‘founding fathers’ and their principles have certainly not provided this motivation; rather, it
has rendered us blind to the injustices of the present and their historical roots.
This is why historians must render judgement and condemn the bastards of the past rather
than apologize for them. Hopelessness and its causes can only be fought if we accept the dark and
disenchanting history that drives them. This acceptance does not result in a comforting story, but I
think, or at least I hope, that it might result in a better world. Trouillot ends his book writing “we

20

Ernest Renan, “What is a Nation,” (conference, Paris, France, 11 March 1882).
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may want to keep in mind that deeds and words are not as distinguishable as we often presume.
History does not belong only to its narrators, professional or amateur. While some of us debate
what history is or was, others take it in their own hands.”21 With each of their words the founders
enacted a deed: creating a narrative that we have yet to escape, silences that go unnoticed, moral
responsibilities that are still avoided. This is the history I attempt to take into my own hands. I can
only hope I will do justice to all who have a stake in it.

Michel-Rolph Trouillot, Silencing the Past: Power and the Production of History (Boston: Beacon Press, 1995), 153.
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Chapter I-Jefferson
Thomas Jefferson was a man best known for the principles he helped codify in the
Declaration of Independence, however an examination of his retirement letters about Latin
American revolutions reveals that these principles were structured around the self-interest of the
United States. Territorial expansion and slavery, rather than a faith in representative government,
drove how Jefferson thought about republicanism in Latin America.
*

*

*

Jefferson’s Perspective
As Thomas Jefferson’s presidency was ending and he was preparing to enter his retirement,
Napoleon Bonaparte’s invasion of the Iberian peninsula sparked the Latin American wars of
independence. The uprisings in Latin America began in earnest around 1809; by then Jefferson had
exited the presidency in March.22 Jefferson looked forward to his retirement for a long time and, as
such, sought to exit public life.23 However, throughout his retirement Jefferson continued to
exchange letters with his foreign and domestic acquaintances, namely Madison and Monroe who,
due to their positions as the following Presidents, were forced to confront the issue of Latin
American independence. These letters continue to highlight Jefferson’s political thoughts after his
political career. Latin American independence and the prospect of a free Western hemisphere
attracted his most direct re-foray into the political realm. Having heard from then President James
Monroe of George Canning’s proposal for a joint-British and American guarantee of Latin
American independence from European interference, Jefferson wrote:

Marcelo Borges, “Independence in Latin America-A Chronology,” Dickinson College, accessed 4 December 2017,
http://users.dickinson.edu/~borges/chronologyindep.htm.
23
Joseph Ellis, American Sphinx (New York: Vintage Books, 1998), 137.
22
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I have been so long weaned from political subjects, and have so long ceased to take any
interest in them, that I am sensible I am not qualified to offer opinions on them worthy of
any attention. But the question now proposed involves consequences so lasting, and effects
so decisive of our future destinies, as to rekindle all the interest I have heretofore felt on
such occasions, and to induce me to the hazard of opinions.24
By his own admission Jefferson was an apolitical individual, or at the very least sought to be. The
question of Canning’s proposal, a proposal which lead to the Monroe doctrine and one which was
impossible without the independence of Latin America, pulled Jefferson out of his apoliticism. For
Jefferson, the independence of Latin America would be “decisive of our future destinies” and this fit
into his overall imagination of the effects representative government would have on the world.
Given that he saw this topic as enormously important, an investigation of his thoughts on the
subject is clearly merited.
As this and the following section will make clear, Jefferson’s views on republicanism in Latin
America were founded not only on his prejudice towards Spanish colonial populations, but also on
the self-interest of the United States and concerns about slavery. Because these foundations are
subtextual, Jefferson’s writings must be thoroughly scoured and compared in order to develop this
picture. This section will highlight the relevant aspects of Jefferson’s identity while the next section
will use this information to develop a picture of Jefferson’s thoughts on representative government
in Latin America.
It is well known that, writing to Madison in 1809, Jefferson imagined the creation of an
“empire of liberty”25 by including Canada in the United States. However, this was somewhat of an
understatement. Writing to Albert Gallatin fourteen years later, Jefferson declared that the advance

Thomas Jefferson, Thomas Jefferson to James Monroe, 24 October 1823, letter printed in Thomas Jefferson: Writings, ed.
Merrill Peterson (New York: The Library of America, 1984) 1481-1485.
25
Thomas Jefferson, Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, 27 April 1809, Manuscript/Mixed Material, retrieved from the
Library of Congress, accessed 26 April 2018, https://www.loc.gov/item/mjm022316/.
24
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of representative government “everywhere in a more or less perfect form….will insure the
amelioration of the condition of the world. It will cost years of blood, and be well worth them.”26
Representative government was not only an ideal system of governance for Jefferson, its
implementation over the course of history was the grand solution to the world’s problems.
Jefferson also approached the world from a specific background outside of his faith in the
prospects of representative government. As scholars such as Caitlin Fitz and Joseph Ellis note,
Jefferson’s Declaration of Independence defined the principles behind the American revolution;27
no wonder Jefferson held the principle of representative government in such high esteem, he helped
monumentalize it both on paper and in the North American cultural consciousness. However
Jefferson was not simply a founding father, he was also a part of the Virginia plantation class and, as
such, a slave owner. With the King of Haiti Henry I supporting Bolivar’s efforts and with
emancipation becoming an ever more dominant theme in the Latin American wars of independence,
Jefferson’s position on this issue is crucial to keep in mind. Additionally, Jefferson’s political
philosophy was deeply rooted in his vision of an American republicanism founded on agrarianism.
Writing to William Short Jefferson said that, contrary to Europe where wars were necessary to
counter overpopulation, in America “room is abundant, population scanty, and peace the necessary
means for producing men, to whom the redundant soil is offering the means of life and happiness.”
28

This principle, he goes on to note, applies to both Americas which ought to preserve peace by

Thomas Jefferson, Thomas Jefferson to Albert Gallatin, 2 August 1823, letter printed in The Works of Thomas Jefferson in
Twelve Volumes, Vol. 12, ed. Paul Ford (New York: The Knickerbocker Press, 1905), 299-300.
27
Joseph Ellis, “Prologue: Jeffersonian Surge: America, 1992-93,” in American Sphinx (New York: Vintage Books, 1998):
3-27.; Caitlin Fitz, “An Imaginary Kindred,” in Our Sister Republics (New York: Liveright Publishing Corporation, 2016):
194-240.
28
Thomas Jefferson, Thomas Jefferson to William Short, 4 August 1820, Manuscript/Mixed Material, retrieved from the
Library of Congress, accessed 4 December 2017, https://www.loc.gov/item/mtjbib021107/.
26
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avoiding the wars in Europe.29 When Jefferson imagines an agrarian future, it is present throughout
the entire hemisphere. Important to remember is that this agrarian future came at the cost of grave
and genocidal consequences for the native inhabitants of the Americas. Jefferson’s thoughts on
representation and agrarian equality must be considered in conjunction with his opinions regarding
enslaved and native persons in order for a complete portrait to guide an analysis of his views on
Latin America.
Also important to consider is that this was not the first foreign revolution Jefferson
witnessed. Jefferson watched the French revolution with initial enthusiasm, only to witness its failure
with the reign of terror and the rise of Napoleon Bonaparte. Writing to Sir John Sinclair Jefferson
voiced his worries about “the position in which Great Britain is placed, and [we, America] should be
sincerely afflicted were any disaster to deprive mankind of the benefit of such a bulwark [Britain]
against the torrent which has for some time been bearing down all before it.”30 He voiced a similar
opinion to the Earl of Buchan, going so far as to “bless the almighty being who in gathering
together the waters under the heavens into one place, divided the drylands of your hemisphere, from
the dry lands of ours, and said, ‘here, at least, be there peace.’”31,32 Watching Napoleon’s military
conquests in Europe, Jefferson was both grateful for the distance the United States benefited from
and worried about possible British failure to stop Napoleonic expansion and the implications this
would have for America.
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The French revolution also touched Jefferson more personally. Jefferson lamented to Pierre
Jean Georges Cabanis “How many excellent friends have we lost in your efforts towards
self-government, et cui bono?”33 Jefferson had lost friends in the French revolution, many of whom
he had presumably interacted with during his time as envoy to France34 and who, given previous
French support of the United States, had played a role in the U.S. revolutionary process. It was not
solely his French colleagues who suffered; Thomas Paine himself was imprisoned and marked for
execution during the revolution.35 Not only had Jefferson watched a revolution he hoped would lead
to a free and representative France descend into an Empire that encroached on the wellbeing of the
U.S., but it had taken the lives of his friends for, as he notes in Latin, “whose benefit?”36
If these were the indirect aspects of Jefferson’s identity and experience informing his
perspective on Latin America, he also had experience with the prospect of Latin American
revolution during his political tenure. In 1805 the revolutionary Francisco de Miranda traveled
throughout the United State to outfit and recruit for his effort to liberate what is now Venezuela
from Spanish control.37 Although his effort was thwarted by the Spanish coast guard,38 the United
States with Jefferson as its president still found itself in the sensitive position of having its weapons
and citizens on board Miranda’s ships. In his 1806 message to Congress, Jefferson outlined a
situation in which the Spanish and United States’ commanders withdrew their forces to either side
of the Sabine river, marking that as a “temporary line of separation….until the issue of our
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negotiations shall be known.”39 Jefferson then went on to highlight his “measures for preventing and
suppressing this [Miranda’s] enterprise….and for arresting and bringing to justice its authors and
abettors.”40 The positioning of this passage right after his description of a Spanish-U.S. territorial
dispute indicates that Jefferson’s efforts to suppress the Miranda expedition, and his highlighting of
them, were intimately connected to the territorial negotiations and maintenance of peace between
the United States and Spain.41 While in office Jefferson valued peace with Spain and the United
States’ territorial success over the questionable prospects of a startup revolutionary. He also frowned
upon U.S. citizens’ support for Miranda, clearly defining that it was not their role “to decide for their
country the question of peace or war, by commencing active and unauthorized hostilities.”42
Jefferson’s previous experience with the prospect of Latin American revolution was decidedly
slanted toward U.S. neutrality and the suppression of attempts at private U.S. involvement.
After he left office Jefferson’s sources of information about events in Latin America began
to wither. Writing to Madison in 1809, just after leaving the Presidency, Jefferson stated that he read
the newspapers very little and that he was extraordinarily skeptical of what he did read.43 However
Caitlin Fitz in Our Sister Republics outlines, in remarkable detail, how news about the occurrences in
Latin America came from merchants, revolutionary agents, and Spanish imperial officials who, after
landing in the United States, went to newspaper printing presses and related what they knew about
the revolutions, or at the very least what they wanted people to hear. These news clips would then
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be reprinted in other papers across the country.44 This, at least in Fitz’s concepcion, is how people
found out about the events of the southern revolutions. Given his limited exposure to newspapers,
it is fair to assume that Jefferson was less informed on a variety of aspects and issues surrounding
these revolutions, getting his news largely from those who wrote to him and only then when the
information was deemed personally interesting in some fashion. This makes Jefferson an unusual
candidate of study, in contrast to Madison and Monroe who were still involved in politics.
Jefferson did have one good source of news aside from his letters: those who paid him a
visit, usually at Monticello. In 1809 Francisco de Miranda met with Jefferson although he still
refused to support Miranda’s cause.45 For general knowledge about Latin America, Jefferson was
largely reliant on his visitors as well as on the writings of Alexander von Humboldt, a German
philosopher and naturalist who traveled throughout South America.46 Jefferson was later visited by a
Mr. Miralla from Buenos Aires who carried with him news of the Cuban position towards
independence.47 Jefferson, therefore, had no personal experience in Latin America and his
engagement with the public discourse surrounding the issue was sparse. He was almost totally reliant
on the personal information provided by others. This made him prone to mirroring the assumptions
of those around him. In his analysis of Jefferson’s position with regards to Spanish America, Zolán
Vajda notes that the positions of Jefferson and those around him oftentimes fell into an “image of
Spain as a despotic power and Roman Catholicism as an institution entangled with it.”48 Vajda goes
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on to connect this outlook to the Black Legend of Spanish cruelty in the Americas. Outside of
following these views himself, Jefferson received much of his information from associates who
would have fallen into similar if not identical biases.
Jefferson’s perspective was, therefore, one defined not only by his political principles and
faith in the ameliorative powers of representative government into the future, but also by his
slave-ownership and agrarian philosophy dependent on the seizure of native land. He looked at
these revolutions after having lost sleep and friends during the dramatic failure of French Revolution
to live up to its promise. He disowned and attempted to prevent a previous revolutionary effort and
received his information almost solely from acquaintances. However, now that the new revolutions
were successful he would have to grapple with the reality of an independent Latin America. This was
the man whose views and perspective the rest of this chapter will parse out and analyze.
Prospects for Representative Government
Jefferson’s core view about the future of representative government in Latin America was
that the newly independent states were destined to fail in their efforts to establish free governments
and, as a result, fall into military “despotism.”49 In his letter to Anne Stael-Holstein Jefferson
outlined exactly how he imagines this will happen given the situation at the time. He wrote that “in
all those countries the most inveterate divisions have arisen, partly among the different casts, partly
among rival-leaders. Constitution after constitution is made and broken and in the meantime
everything is at the mercy of the military leaders.”50 Jefferson predicts military despotism largely
because of the divisions present within Latin American society and, due to the general lack of order,
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assumes that the leaders of the military structures will seize control. While Jefferson references the
contemporary situation to make this prediction, the reasons behind it are in fact much more
structural and deeply rooted in Latin American society and history.
The crux of why Jefferson thought military despotism was inevitable in the Latin American
context was the state of education. In 1813 Jefferson wrote to Alexander von Humboldt that
geographic region was characterized by the “lowest grade of ignorance” and writing to P.S. Dupont
de Nemours, Jefferson declared that “the degrading ignorance into which their priests and kings
have sunk them, has disqualified them from the maintenance or even the knowledge of their rights and
that much blood may be shed for little improvement in their condition.”51 For Jefferson, the
ignorance of the population is such that, even if the people had the power to institute free
government over the opposition of other social forces, they would not know to do it because they
were unaware of their rights: in essence, of what freedom is. This language is woven throughout
dozens of Jefferson’s letters, though he does outline some possible exceptions. Having heard from
Humboldt that Mexico is “not wanting” of “men of science”52 he accepts a possibility that it “may
revolutionize itself under better auspices.”53 He also, in a letter to the Marquis de Lafayette in 1817,
declares that “Brazil is more populous more wealthy, more energetic, and as wise as Portugal”54 so
perhaps Brazil would be excluded from Jefferson’s destiny of despotism. Even with these differing
cases, Jefferson’s view on the Latin American populace was centered on the concept of ignorance.
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Jefferson imagined the ignorance of the Latin American populace leading to despotic
governments because of a maxim he describes to Lafayette. He declared it “one of the
impossibilities of nature that ignorance should maintain itself free against cunning, where any
government has once been admitted.”55 This maxim leads to Jefferson’s questioning “How much
liberty can they bear without intoxication?”56 Written into this question through the word
“intoxication” is a concern about the mob. The ignorance of the Latin American populace, in
Jefferson’s mind, is clearly connected to the possibility for a drunken or crazed group of individuals
to either seize power or cause general violence and mayhem. This concern was not entirely
unfounded in past experience, especially considering examples such as Shays’ rebellion or the
violence of the mob during the French Revolution. Here, Jefferson extends this intoxication to the
entirety of the population, indicating the depth to which he was prejudiced against the ability of the
Latin American people to govern and moderate themselves.
Jefferson imagined the harmful manifestation of this ignorance specifically in connection to
questions of government structure and leadership. This is why he declared it impossible for
ignorance to maintain freedom in the face of “cunning” specifically when “any government has once
been admitted.”57 This maxim is found in his earlier letter to Von Humboldt in which, after his
questioning of liberty under intoxication, he went on to ask “Are their chiefs sufficiently enlightened
to form a well-guarded government, and their people to watch their chiefs?”58 Perhaps because of
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his contribution to a rebellion against monarchical control, the problem of ignorance manifests itself
most clearly in a fear of individual despotic rule. In this same letter Jefferson “imagine[s] they will
copy our outlines of confederation and elective government” but that:
Their greatest difficulty will be in the construction of the executive. I suspect that, regardless
of the experiment of France and of the United States….they will begin with a directory, and
when the unavoidable schisms in that kind of executive shall drive them to something else,
their great question will come on whether to substitute an executive elective for years, for
life, or an hereditary one. But unless instruction can be spread among them more rapidly
than experience promises, despotism may come upon them before they are qualified to save
the ground they will have gained.59
Jefferson locates the effect of ignorance directly in the construction of the executive and his
prediction is telling because he almost directly outlines the process through which the French
Revolution fell apart, from directory to a despotic executive. Indeed Jefferson references the
“experiment of France” in this passage, directly linking two revolutions quite different in their
geographic locale and character. Even more telling is that Jefferson then asks whether Napoleon
could secure the “independence of all the West India Islands.”60
Here Jefferson’s analytical structure fits under what might be termed a post-Napoleonic
anxiety. Jefferson references the exact process in which the French revolution fell apart, attaches
that process to South America’s future, then references Napoleon in the same breath. His
compositional process reveals the origin of his worries surrounding Latin America. Indeed, when
writing to Lafayette in 1817, Jefferson declared that “they [‘our southern brethren’] will fall under
military despotism, and become the murderous tools of the ambition of their respective
Bonapartes.”61 In his earlier letter to Stael-Holstein, Jefferson links “ignorance and bigotry” to the
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end of “free government” in the region declaring that “it is excruciating to believe that all will end in
military despotisms under the Bonapartes of their regions.”62 The union between Jefferson’s
terminology and his vision for how the newly independent south will descend into despotism reveals
that his perspective on Latin America was rooted in the experience of watching the French
revolution collapse and in the fear that Bonaparte may break through the British levee and negatively
impact the United States in more tangible ways.
Indeed Jefferson’s analyses of what might have prevented despotism in France and what
might prevent despotism in Latin America bear considerable similarities. In his 1803 letter to
Cabanis, Jefferson stated that if Napoleon gave France “as great a portion of liberty as the opinions,
habits, & character of the nation are prepared for, progressive preparation may fit you for
progressive portions of that first of blessings, and you may in time attain what we erred in supposing
could be hastily siesed & maintained.”63 Fifteen years later Jefferson wrote to Adams about the
South American revolutions saying “I do believe it would be better for them to obtain freedom by
degrees only; because that would bring on light and information, and qualify them to take charge of
themselves understandingly”64 while noting that in the interim they should be controlled because
peace must be kept. Jefferson’s ideas about the proper process for the institution of representative
government in Latin America are nearly identical to his retrospective thoughts on what ought to
have been done in France. In his 1817 letter to Lafayette, Jefferson outlined some of the reforms he
imagines happening in this time, including the gathering of “experience, their emancipation from

62

Thomas Jefferson, Thomas Jefferson to Anne L. G. N. Stael-Holstein, 6 September 1816, Manuscript/Mixed Material,
retrieved from the Library of Congress, accessed 2 November 2017, https://www.loc.gov/item/mtjbib022570/.
63
Thomas Jefferson, Thomas Jefferson to Pierre Jean Georges Cabanis, 13 July 1803, letter printed in Barbara Oberg, ed.
The Papers of Thomas Jefferson Vol. 41 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014), 42-43.
64
Thomas Jefferson, Thomas Jefferson to John Adams, 17 May 1818, letter printed in The Works of Thomas Jefferson in
Twelve Volumes, Vol. 12, ed. Paul Ford (New York: The Knickerbocker Press, 1905), 95-96.

23
their priests, and advancement in information.”65 Jefferson imagines education, the experience of
externally moderated self government, and release from the influence of the Catholic church as
being the major components required for representative government to function in Latin America.
His focus on priests emerges out of his general view, spread across the breadth of his writing on the
subject, that priests contribute to the ignorance and bigotry of the population. This, again as Vajda
notes, goes back to the Black Legend and the Spanish colonial experience.
These were Jefferson’s views, but their interrogation reveals the close relationship between
the structure of these views and the self-interest of the United States. This self-interest manifests
most clearly when, as will be shown, Jefferson’s views vary according to the possibility for U.S.
territorial expansion. This expansionist focus is important to consider in connection to the Monroe
Doctrine, a link which the third chapter of this project will draw.
Vadja locates the core of Jefferson’s position in a “theory of progress”66 writing that
Jefferson and his compatriots thought nations developed in the same ways and so particular levels of
progress could be predicted as requirements for representative government.67 However, there are
strong contradictions in this position if we place Jefferson’s opinion on the ‘educational process’
together with his comments about Europe and the prospects for U.S. territorial expansion. Jefferson
wrote that “I do not despair of Europe. The advance of mind which has taken place everywhere
cannot retrograde”68 before going on to describe the previously quoted ameliorative prospects of
representative government. The “mind” of Europe is advancing even though Europe appears, in his
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time, still Catholic and still under the influence of kings, the two influences he notes as having the
most harmful effects on the prospect of representative government in Latin America.
The contradiction gets even stronger when the self-interest of the United States becomes
involved. Vadja uses Louisiana as an example of a Catholic region whose incorporative process into
the United States reveals the implementation structure of Jefferson’s theory of progress. Vajda walks
through how Louisiana was structured as a territory in 1804, before being granted the power to elect
federal representatives in 1805, and finally being given full statehood in 1812, although even then
with limited autonomous control.69 Outside of the retained restrictions, Louisiana effectively took
about eight years to become a state with an equal federal role to the others. However Jefferson, in
his 1811 letter to Dupont de Nemours declared that in Latin America even “should their new rulers
lay their shoulders to remove the great obstacles of ignorance, and press the remedies of education
and information, they will still be in jeopardy until another generation comes into place, and what
may happen in the interval cannot be predicted.”70 Jefferson believes it will take at least a generation
to fully ingrain the practice of representative government into the Spanish territorial population even
though he helps personally oversee the eight year process of Louisiana becoming a state with
relatively equal rights to the rest. The clear differentiating factor here is that Louisiana was to
become a part of the United States, directly adding its territory and resources to the U.S., while Latin
America was not.
This double-standard continues when Jefferson wrote about Florida and Cuba that “I have
ever looked on Cuba as the most interesting addition which could be made to our system of States”
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and earlier that “we may as well receive the offers of the Floridas & Cuba, which probably be

made to us by their inhabitants.”72 While Vajda notes reservations about Louisiana’s population,
these reservations are overcome quite quickly and when Jefferson writes about Florida and Cuba he
includes no mention of the populations not being able to maintain the representative government
structure that would be imposed on them by the United States. This is in contrast to his constantly
vocalized reservations about this ability in the revolutionary Latin American context. Once again,
with the possibility of territorial expansion Jefferson overlooks the limitations that would otherwise
restrict his belief in the capacity for representative government.
This rational is reinforced in his outline of the benefits of Cuban inclusion into the United
States in which Jefferson stated that “the control which, with Florida Point, this island would give us
over the Gulf of Mexico and the countries and isthmus bordering on it, as well as all those whose
waters flow into it, would fill up the measure of our political well-being.”73 Here Jefferson focuses
solely on the benefit for the United States rather than on the problems with implementing
representative government in these populations. Vadja’s “theory of progress” cannot, therefore, be
applied to Jefferson in all instances. In cases where the United States stood to gain territory and its
corresponding advantage, Jefferson was clearly willing to overlook the downsides of what in his view
ought to be an ‘ignorant and bigoted’ population incapable of liberty “without intoxication.” This
exception is best explained by the gravity of the benefit Cuba and Florida would bestow on the
United States. Jefferson was willing to diagnose and condemn those far away Latin American
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revolutions but when the United States stood to territorially benefit, Jefferson’s reservations about a
Catholic colonial population were easily overcome.
There is, however, another explanation for this: slavery. Underneath all of Jefferson’s
commentary on Latin American revolutions is a complete silence regarding slavery. Although
Jefferson assuredly knew about the anti-slavery projects that were included in Latin American
independence—Fitz’s outline of the American popular knowledge of this renders it nigh impossible
that Jefferson could not know—he says absolutely nothing about it. Jefferson’s double standard with
regard to Southern Latin America as opposed to Florida and Cuba takes on a new light when placed
next to another letter to Monroe. In this he stated “to us the province of Techas [Texas] will be the
richest State of our Union, without any exception. Its southern part will make more sugar than we
can consume, and the Red river, on its north, is the most luxuriant on earth.”74 What Louisiana,
Florida, Cuba, and Texas all had in common outside of their potential for U.S. expansion was that
they were all viable slave states. The sugar plantations Jefferson envisions making Texas “the richest
State of our Union, without any exception” would clearly be created through a drastic expansion of
slavery into the region. During this time all sugar plantations had and continued to run using slaves
and neither Jefferson nor any politician referencing the wealth of sugar production in the region
would have assumed otherwise. One extraordinarily crucial difference, then, between the colonial
Catholic populations revolting farther south and those living farther north is that the former were
engaged in a process of emancipation while the latter presented the opportunity for a radical
expansion of both territory and the economic engine of slavery. Jefferson’s status as a slave owner
himself only heightens slavery’s validity as an explanation for his double standard regarding Catholic
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colonial populations. Ignorance and bigotry, it seems, were created under Catholic Spanish colonial
rule but could be forgiven by U.S. expansionism.
Adding to this, Fitz’s book does a great deal of work to prove the impact slavery had on
American perceptions of the Latin American revolutions. While her book highlights that up until
around 1826 most public statements about these revolutions avoided critiquing the deconstruction
of slavery in these contexts, the book also relates how after 1826 the opposition to John Quincy
Adams’ delegation to the Panama Convention focused on slavery as a primary tactic of their
opposition. Once Senator John Randolph and other politicians brought this issue to the forefront, it
took hold in the American public and led to the questioning not only of support for the Panama
Convention and the revolutions, but of the very principles of equality outlined in the Declaration of
Independence.75 Fitz tracks these changes using political speeches, newspapers, and Fourth of July
toasts and while these get at public discourse, they do not provide direct insight into the individual’s
private thoughts. The rapidity of the shift from acceptance of emancipation as a tool of revolution
to direct and extremely racialized critique can, however, serve as evidence for slavery’s importance in
Jefferson’s perception of the revolutions. It was slave owners like Jefferson who, once this racialized
pro-slavery rhetoric was begun, took to it with remarkable speed and what becomes clear from this
speed was that slavery was always, in some fashion, a part of their private perceptions of Latin
American revolutions. Fitz does not make this point and Jefferson died before the discourse-shift
she outlines occurs, but given Jefferson’s position as a slave owner within the same Virginia
plantation class, it is reasonable to extend this racialized view of the revolutions to Jefferson, at least
in part. Although he presumably would have opposed Randolph’s attack on the principles he wrote
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into the Declaration, Jefferson’s near-salivation at the wealth of sugar-producing Texas as opposed
to his extreme skepticism regarding the revolutions farther South, combined with his position in a
society that quickly embraced racialized rhetoric once it was made publicly acceptable, render slavery
an excellent explanation for his skepticism of representative governments in this region.
Vadja’s “theory of progress” explanation must, therefore, be contextualized within
Jefferson’s identity and the politics of slavery. Jefferson’s reservations were clearly mitigated by the
prospects of territorial expansion, profit, and strategic gain on the part of the United States,
especially on the part of the Southern half of the United States. Jefferson’s views were influenced by
more than his Black Legend based biases and picture of the Latin American populace as
undeveloped: they are deeply wrapped up with the experience of the French Revolution, the
self-interest of the United States, and based around Jefferson’s racialized perspective. These factors
are not directly noted in Jefferson’s writings but are present subtextually, in his allusions, choice of
words, and unspoken realities. For Jefferson, the Latin American revolutions contained the potential
for all of the things he fears most: the imposition of Catholicism, violent military despotism, and a
violent end of slavery. They also, most crucially, had no potential for U.S. territorial expansion and,
in fact, the formation of new states meant that the U.S. could not take over these territories after
Spain ceded control. These were the imaginations that drove his perspective on the prospects for
representative government in these new Latin American states.
A Preferable Course of Events
If slavery and territorial expansion drove Jefferson’s ideas about whether Latin America was
capable of representative government, they also informed the course he hoped history would take.
The plan Jefferson laid out contradicted his support of independence but clearly advanced the

29
interests of the United States. This provides further proof that undergirding Jefferson’s principles
was a clear notion of this interest and its primacy. In order to discuss this plan in detail, this section
will first extrapolate the factors motivating U.S. action as well as the potential benefits and
downsides to such action. Jefferson’s ideal course of events will then be analyzed in light of these
factors and the self-interested nature of the scheme, and the implications of this, will then be
extrapolated.
Jefferson was a participant in the U.S. act of revolution, calling for independence and
engaging in the debates and political efforts surrounding its achievement. Therefore, his perspective
extended beyond thoughts on representative government to the methods by which this government
should be created. As was shown above, Jefferson thought that the people of Latin America were
not ready for self-governance, however this belief did not prevent his support for their revolutions.
In a letter to John Adams, Jefferson wrote that “it is our duty to wish them independence and
self-government, because they wish it themselves, and they have the right, and we none, to chose for
themselves and I wish, moreover, that our ideas may be erroneous, and theirs prove well founded.”76
Jefferson notes his doubts in this letter, but puts them aside to assert that the revolutionaries have
the right to engage in their efforts. This attitude continues into his letter to Antoine Destutt de Tracy
in which he declares that “prepared however, or not, for self-government, if it is their will to make
the trial, it is our duty and desire to wish it cordially success, and of ultimate success there can be no
doubt, and that it will richly repay all intermediate sufferings.”77 Jefferson goes farther in this letter,
arguing that the revolutions and attempts at self-governance will eventually succeed and pay off.
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However, he also notes his reservations about the preparations of the revolutionaries and these had
a clear influence on the path Jefferson thinks the revolutions ought to take.
While political, economic, and strategic reasons motivating support will be discussed,
Jefferson also put forward a core reason for this support whose logic would resonate into the
actions of his presidential successors. Writing to James Monroe in 1816, Jefferson said that the Latin
American revolutions should be extended “every kindness….every friendly office and aid within the
limits of the law of nations” because “this is but an assertion of our own independence.”78
Jefferson’s support goes beyond just wishing these nations well; for him their independence is
innately tied to that of the United States. Having just exited the War of 1812, arguably the second
and definitive war for American independence, the United States still wielded relatively little
influence and so these Latin American revolutions presented both an opportunity and a problem.
Jefferson’s use of “our independence” reveals that he framed these revolutions not only as
important in and of themselves, but important especially because of how they related to the United
States. This adds to the analysis in previous sections which also make clear that the self-interest of
the United States is the lens through which Jefferson views these events. It also foreshadows the
Monroe Doctrine’s perspective that the situation in Latin America was inherently linked to the
concerns of the United States.
While the U.S. had reasons to support Latin American revolutions, it was also nudged into
doing so by various factors. Firstly, the United States was put in the position of principally having to
support these revolutions due to their similarity to its own. It would be hard for the United States to
condemn revolutions based around the goals of independence from colonial control and
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representative government because doing so would be condemn the principles upon which its own
revolution was founded. In Our Sister Republics, Fitz walks through how, by this time, a sense of these
principles was already established in U.S. political culture.79 This might have remained only a
problem in theory if not for the second dilemma which was the incredible amount of public support
for these revolutions in the United States. Using Fourth of July toasts, town names, baby names, and
other metrics Fitz displays how incredibly popular these revolutions became as word of them spread
throughout the United States. Additionally, revolutionary agents arriving in America went to the
newspapers to drum up support for their cause, frequently referencing the American revolution as
the inspiration and model for the southern revolutions. While this was often an exaggeration based
on their audience, it emphasized the principled reasons why the United States should support the
revolutions to the national public, making the contradiction of refusing support much harder for
politicians to defend or electorally endure.80
Although support was motivated by the actions of these revolutionary agents and the will of
the public, the U.S. also had its own political and economic reasons for supporting the further
independence of the American hemisphere. Trade with Latin America presented a clear opportunity
for economic expansion. Independence would release the colonies from their obligation to trade
only within Spain’s imperial network and, while the majority of U.S. southern trade was with Cuba,
merchants sensed the potential profits to be reaped by the opening up of these additional regions to
greater economic ties.81 Especially if Cuba returned to its inter-imperial trading obligations, trade
with an independent South America and Mexico could help offset the deficit this would create.
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Additionally, an independent South and Central America presented a clearly advantageous
geopolitical situation for the U.S. In his 1813 letter to Von Humboldt Jefferson wrote that:
In whatever governments they end they will be American governments, no longer to be
involved in the never-ceasing broils of Europe….America has a hemisphere to itself. It must
have its separate system of interests, which must not be subordinated to those of Europe.
The insulated state in which nature has placed the American continent should so far avail it
that no spark of war kindled in the other quarters of the globe should be wafted across the
wide oceans which separate us from them.82
With the independence of the Americas, Jefferson envisioned a future in which the metropole and
colonial wars of Europe never disrupted the United States or the rest of the Americas. These new
nations would be able to trade in peace, free from the threat of European embargo, leveraging of
resources and men for war, and other disruptive activities. Furthermore, a continent free of
European influence would relieve the United States of the possibility that actions around its own
territory would draw it into war with a much stronger European state, a process that equally
threatened to draw the United States into European alliance and all of the events Washington
cautioned against in his farewell address.83 This freedom of action would also allow for a smoother
U.S. expansion throughout the Western hemisphere. This goal and theme is found throughout
Jefferson’s thought including in his 1823 letter to President Monroe which would be a part of the
debate leading to the Monroe Doctrine.84
Jefferson also saw independence as eventually leading to peace with Spain, writing to
Monroe that “their separation from Spain seals our everlasting peace with her.”85 He went on to
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write that “so long as they are dependent, Spain from her jealousy, is our natural enemy and always
in either open or secret hostility with us. These countries, too, in war, will be a powerful weight in
her scale, and, in peace, totally shut to us.”86 Jefferson thought the independence of Spain’s colonies
was required in order for the U.S. to keep peace with Spain, an issue naturally on his mind after the
devastation of the war of 1812 which had a personal effect on Jefferson’s finances as well as the
entire nation.87
This goal of peace was also connected to the type of government Jefferson hoped these new
states would enact. In 1822 Jefferson wrote that “it is lawful to wish to see no emperors nor king in
our hemisphere, and that Brazil as well as Mexico will homologize with us.”88 This theme continued
into the 1823 letter in which he wrote that “our endeavor should surely be, to make our hemisphere
that of freedom.”89 While Jefferson was not a democratic peace theorist, he wrote about
representative government and a peaceful future in the same pen stroke and so, in his imagination,
these two things were closely linked. Writing to Lafayette in 1813, after presenting the threat of the
revolutions ending in military despotism Jefferson asserted that “among these there can be no
confederacy. A republic of kings is impossible. But their future wars and quarrels among themselves
will oblige them to bring the people into action.”90 This letter demonstrates that when Jefferson
envisioned an independent Latin America, he thought that the only way it could be peaceful, and the
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least disruptive to the U.S. was if it were to be self-governed.91 This combination of principle, public
opinion, and economic and political incentives put the United States in a position where it had to
support these revolutions in some way.
There were also significant dangers to this support. The first of these were the pitfalls
involved with the U.S. making an enemy of Spain and it was Jefferson’s firm opinion that the U.S.
should avoid war. In his letter to Destutt de Tracy, Jefferson said that “we view Europe as covering
at present a smothered fire, which may shortly burst forth and produce general conflagration. From
this it is our duty to keep aloof.”92 Jefferson believed that this war would “hurt us more than it
would help our brethren of the South” and that their generation had to pay its own war debts before
more could be incurred which, he thought, would constitute “mortgaging posterity.”93 Jefferson saw
the prospect of war with Spain as extraordinarily harmful to the United States, drawing it into a
broader European conflict and creating a great deal of debt that would harm U.S. fiscal security into
the future. Indeed, in an 1820 letter to Monroe Jefferson declared that “neither the state of our
finances, the condition of our country, nor the public opinion, urges us to precipitation into war”94
and voiced his support for the U.S. treaty with Spain. For Jefferson, then, all factors seemed bent
against war. Having had three major wars-the Seven Years War, the War of U.S. Independence, and
the War of 1812-occur within his own lifetime, part of Jefferson’s hesitation to strongly support the
revolutions seems to stem from war weariness. The prospect of triggering conflict with Spain was,
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therefore, a powerful reason against clear and strong U.S. support of the Latin American
revolutions.
With regards to Spain, other negative consequences were possible, either connected to the
possibility of war or independent from it. During this period the United States was consistently
engaged in negotiations with Spain over territory, namely the Floridas. Inciting Spanish anger would
assuredly jeopardize those negotiations and the addition of future slave states to the U.S. There was
also the matter of trade. The United States engaged in a great deal of trade with both Cuba and with
the Iberian peninsula,95 much more than with the rest of Spanish America and this trade could cease
in the event of a conflict with, or the displeasure of, the Spanish crown. Economically and
territorially the U.S. had a lot to lose by supporting these new revolutions.
These were largely the same concerns Jefferson faced when he made the decision not to aid
Francisco de Miranda’s attempted revolution and to disown and prosecute all those involved in it.
Jefferson had previously made the calculation that these potential losses were not worth the risk of
supporting an independence effort in the South, but now that these independence efforts were
happening and were succeeding the issue was forced upon the U.S. in a way it was not by the
Miranda affair. Although the same concerns were present with Bolivar’s revolution if lessened by
Napoleon’s Iberian invasion, the U.S. was unable to base its position around the total neutrality that
Jefferson had previously found so advantageous.
Because of the viability of these revolutions, a new set of threats emerged beyond just the
Spanish reaction to U.S. support. When Jefferson looked at South and Central America, he saw an
uncertain future and one whose structure was potentially hostile to U.S. interests. This potentially
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hostile structure had two main prongs, one economic and one political. Economically Jefferson saw
the newly independent Latin American states as rivals. Writing to Monroe in 1816, Jefferson said
that “when they are free, they will drive every article of our produce from every market, by
underselling it, and change the condition of our existence, forcing us into other habits and pursuits.
We shall, indeed, have in exchange some commerce with them, but in what I know not, for we shall
have nothing to offer which they cannot raise cheaper.”96 In Jefferson’s imagination of the future of
American commerce, South and Central American goods provide direct competition to the
economic well being of the U.S. He did think there would be some advantage gained in terms of
commerce, but there would be significant downsides that this would have to be weighed against.
Additionally, and perhaps more worryingly, Jefferson was concerned with the potential
political, and possibly military, rivalry of these Latin American nations still in the process of being
created. Jefferson wrote that they will “perhaps have formed themselves into one or more
confederacies; more than one I hope, as in single mass they would be a very formidable neighbor.”97
In this passage Jefferson displays a clear anxiety about the possibility that his dream of hemispheric
peace would be eradicated by a powerful polity to the South. This worry clearly emerged in part
because he had watched the French Revolution lead to Napoleon’s conquest of Europe. This is
backed up by all of the allusions to Napoleon highlighted earlier in this chapter and also by the
realities of the situation. The U.S. did not benefit from the “bulwark”98 of Britain nor the Atlantic
Ocean as barriers preventing the revolutionary violence in the South from gradually extending north
to its shores. Indeed this extension must have felt entirely possible given the proximity of Mexico.
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The link to Napoleon is apt for another reason: Simon Bolivar. Bolivar conquered more territory
than Napoleon99 and oftentimes in harsher conditions. He was the hero of many U.S. songs,100 but
Jefferson’s Napoleonic anxiety would presumably only be exponentially increased by Bolivar’s
success. While, in an 1823 letter to Monroe Jefferson declared that “of the brethren of our own
hemisphere, none are yet, nor for an age to come will be, in a shape, condition, or disposition to war
against us”101 this letter comes after the concerns already outlined in this chapter and after the 1816
solution these concerns resulted in, which will be analyzed shortly. Jefferson, therefore, was worried
about a strong South or Central American state which could at the very least exert an influence to
challenge that of the U.S., and at the worst engage in Napoleonic, or perhaps better termed,
Bolivarian actions aimed Northward. This fear was heightened by the possibility that such actions
might violently destabilize the southern slave economy.102 Additionally, even if unable to impact the
U.S. itself, strong Latin American states would provide effective resistance to U.S. plans for
territorial expansion.
These, then, were Jefferson’s concerns about the situation. Jefferson noted that “on the
question of our interest in their independence, were that alone a sufficient motive of action, much
may be said on both sides.”103 As has been outlined in this section and as Jefferson’s words
themselves support, the question of U.S. interest was a mixed one. However, later on in that very
same letter Jefferson goes on to write that “interest, then, on the whole, would wish their
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independence, and justice makes the wish a duty.”104 The overall interest of the U.S., justice, and the
other reasons outlined above all motivate the U.S. to wish for Latin American success. In this case
the question then becomes how representative government structures might most peacefully and
effectively be instituted in Latin America. This question is closely connected to Jefferson’s doubts
about the viability of this. In relation to these doubts, Jefferson says that while he might wish them
to successfully implement self-government “the question is not what we wish, but what is
practicable?”105
Jefferson had a very clear answer to what he thought was “practicable” which he
communicated to Lafayette in the same 1817 letter. In this Jefferson declared that:
The best thing for them, would be for themselves to come to an accord with Spain, under
the guarantee of France, Russia, Holland, and the United States, allowing to Spain a nominal
supremacy, with authority only to keep the peace among them, leaving to them otherwise all
the powers of self-government, until their experience in them, their emancipation from their
priests, and advancement in information, shall prepare them for complete independence.106
Jefferson outlines a kind of multilateral state building and peacekeeping scheme that is unusual and
the tenants of which must be parsed to reveal exactly why he thinks this would be the best way for
independence and the creation of representative government to be structured. First of all, this was in
no way “practicable” because Catholic Spain would never agree to a plan that hinged partially on the
goal of ‘emancipating’ the Latin American populace from the influence of the Catholic Church.
Secondly, no revolutionary leader knowing they were on the verge of victory would ever agree to live
under the “nominal supremacy” of Spain even if it was with the goal of keeping the peace, largely
because they would have no reason to trust Spain or the other nations’ willingness to go to war with
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Spain to keep it in check. This plan, then, makes no practical sense but it has one crucial, basic
effect: it gives the U.S. more leverage and control over the future of its hemispheric neighbors than
it otherwise would have.
Analyzed through this lens, Jefferson’s scheme seems to solve all of the potential downsides
to Latin American independence while retaining the benefits. By including Spain in its structure, this
plan would allow the U.S. to fully support the spread of representative government into the rest of
the Americas without the risk of angering Spain and triggering negative responses in the spheres of
trade or war. Furthermore, it would assure peace is maintained in the region. These new states would
not have to support Spain in the event of a conflict with the U.S. and Spain would act as a check on
any violence they might seek to impose on each other or on the U.S. In creating this structure, the
U.S. might have a voice as to whether Latin America would be divided, as Jefferson thought it ought
to be in order to prevent the formation of an effective rival to the U.S. Helping to broker a deal, the
United States would be at the negotiating table and could attach provisions to the arrangement to
mitigate the potential political and military harms these new states might create for the United States.
Negotiating this arrangement might allow the U.S. to try and structure trade in such a way as to
guard against the harmful flow of Latin American goods into the market. Finally, the creation of
such a structure might give the U.S. the opportunity, as was common in such conferences, to
arrange for a transfer of some Spanish territory into U.S. control. Regardless of whether these things
would happen, the U.S. would be able to play a greater role in designing the future were it part of
such an structure.
This plan might also protect American slavery because Spain’s profits from slavery and the
slave trade, especially through its sugar plantations in Cuba, meant Spain had a great deal of
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incentive to ensure that further emancipation was halted. Giving Spain “nominal supremacy” and
the ability to “keep the peace” would allow these incentives to be harnessed towards the guarantee
of slavery’s continuation in the United States and the Caribbean, including Cuba which was greatly
coveted by the U.S. Additionally, the exclusion of Britain, perhaps the most important state at the
time, from this scheme is noteworthy and could be explained by the previous history of conflict but
the more likely explanation concerns the slave trade. Excluding Britain from the hemisphere meant
excluding its campaign against the slave trade and protecting deeply entrenched U.S. interests in the
illegal slave trade. This connection will be expanded upon in chapter three but is worth noting here.
Analyzed in light of what the U.S. stood to gain and lose from supporting these revolutions, or
simply from their existence, it is clear that Jefferson’s scheme reduced all of the downsides and
dilemmas the United States faced while allowing for the full leveraging of the opportunity these
revolutions presented for furthering U.S. interests.
This was not implemented, but the basic idea that the U.S. ought to have a role in
determining the future of the American hemisphere was clearly present in the arguments in favor of
the U.S. attending the 1826 Congress of Panama organized by Simon Bolivar. Henry Clay argued
that the United States should attend because it would allow the U.S. to try to prevent any further
emancipatory efforts on the part of Latin American revolutionaries, namely the invasion and freeing
of Cuba.107 U.S. politics around these meetings largely revolved around questions of how to
moderate these anti-slavery impulses and we can see the same outcome is achievable in Jefferson’s
plan. Jefferson was mirroring the ‘moderating force’ reasoning driving the U.S. mission to Panama.

Caitlin Fitz, Our Sister Republics (New York: Liveright Publishing Corporation, 2016), 214.

107

41
That this was Jefferson’s prefered course of events and that it directly lined up with the U.S.
interest is important for a variety of reasons. Firstly, the plan he outlined directly contradicts his
principled stance on independence. Jefferson stated that “they have a right to be free” and that
“justice”108 is behind the duty of the U.S. to wish these states success, but then advocated for a
system in which he gave Spain “nominal supremacy” over these states. His contradiction of the
principle is explained largely by this principle being conditional on the favorability of its outcome to
the United States, especially its ambitions for territorial expansion and the slave economy. This
spilled over into how he evaluated the prospects for representative government itself. Jefferson’s
plan for gradual independence comes right after his questioning of the ability of the South and
Central American populace to govern itself. This questioning, then, is closely linked to his U.S.
advantageous solution. By doubting their ability, Jefferson creates a convenient rationale for devising
a system to give the U.S. greater control over the future of its neighbors. Whether a people is
capable of governing themselves and the methods through which they should go about doing it
were, in Jefferson’s thoughts, dependent on the interests of the United States. Although he did not
directly say this, the contradictions and patterns in his thought reveal that although he held up the
principle of freedom, he did so when it was convenient and called its viability into question
whenever it was not.
Conclusion
Both Jefferson’s views on the possibility for the success of republicanism in Latin America
and his thoughts on how this would best be created were subservient to the interests of the United
States. Freedom, self-governance, and independence were, even in the mind of one of their most
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famous authors, principles that were to be adhered to only if it was advantageous to do so.
Jefferson’s position as the creator of the broader American ideology makes this subservience even
more striking. He was a unique actor whose perspective on this moment manifested in two areas: his
vision for territorial expansion and his position as a slaveholder. This is important because these
lenses inform his vision for what Latin American independence ought to look like. Fitz’ Our Sister
Republics highlights an explosion in slave owner concern about Latin American emancipation efforts
that could not have emerged out of a void. More probable is that these concerns were latent,
removed from the public sphere and Jefferson, as a slave owner, was party to these very concerns.
Furthermore, only a few years after these letters were written the U.S. became preoccupied with
halting the spread of Latin American emancipation into Cuba and given that Jefferson was writing
and conversing with the same political class that would debate this, it is unlikely he was not privy to
these same concerns and that he did not share them. Jefferson looked toward both Cuba and Texas
as territories whose inclusion into the U.S. would yield slave-based economies of immense value,
and he owned slaves himself. Jefferson’s perspective was inherently wrapped up in slavery.
When he wrote about the possibility of military despotisms, alluded to the fear of
Napoleonic leaders, and devised plans in which the slave-based Spanish Empire would keep the
newly independent nations in check, it was from this perspective. In this moment Jefferson was an
actor uncertain about what the future of his hemisphere would be. So when Jefferson looked south,
he imagined what for him was the worst: seeing the possibility for military despotism, Latin
American unity, and the rise of a military leader whose further conquests could bring emancipation
to the United States’ very doorstep or, at the very least, halt U.S. plans for territorial expansion.
Indeed, Bolivar conquered more territory than Napoleon based partly on the strategy of
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emancipation and Toussaint L’Ouverture was one of the few leaders successful in standing up to
Napoleon. Jefferson imagined a Latin America based on emancipation with the resources to enact
this ideology of freedom throughout the hemisphere if not kept on the Spanish leash. This fear fits
within Jefferson’s general psychological perspective. Slave owners were constantly terrified of slave
rebellions and poisoning, and this was so deeply a part of their perspective that they might have
worried about publishing information about Latin American emancipation for fear that the example
would motivate U.S. slaves to their own rebellion.109 Additionally, Britain’s previous use of the
promise of emancipation to leverage U.S. slaves against their masters, and the presence of black
military leaders throughout the wars in Latin America, assuredly only heightened this concern.
Jefferson’s, then, was a perspective defined by a much larger version of slave rebellion phobia: the
fear of intra-hemispheric emancipatory conquest. While at times he might have doubted the ability
of these new states to wage war against the U.S., the possibility stemming from Bolivar’s unlikely
success and future likelihood of this ability meant that this was still a very reasonable concern. Even
if it was not reasonable, Jefferson’s perspective being so deeply rooted in slave owner fears made
even improbable possibilities seem terrifying and Jefferson’s prefered vision of Latin American
government was informed by this fear.
Outside of this fear, Jefferson’s differentiation between Mexico and Cuba, Florida and
Venezuela, Louisiana and La Plata demonstrates that, for him, U.S. expansion was a key concern.
Latin America was a possible venue for this expansion, but it could also be a hindrance. Looking to
the future, Jefferson prefered a world where Latin America could be reigned in by the U.S. so that
his vision of territorial growth, including a radical expansion of slave-based agriculture, could be
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realized. Not only was his vision of when representative government was viable driven by this goal,
but so was his plan to implement this government in the long-term. Jefferson prefered Spain keep a
monarchical hold on an increasingly republican Latin America because otherwise the U.S. might lose
its status as the increasingly dominant power in the hemisphere, and all the potential for expansion
that went along with it.
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Chapter II-Madison
James Madison, a primary designer of the U.S. constitution, is a figure one would expect to
have much to say about representative government in Latin America. However, Madison actually
had little to say on the topic. Compared to his reaction to the French revolution, Madison’s
approach to Latin American revolutions was more strategic than principled, focused around the
geopolitical interests of the United States. This strategic focus was rooted in Madison’s identity as a
slave owner, a perspective through which he viewed the southern revolutions that were undertaken,
in large part, by persons of color.
*

*

*

Madison’s Perspective
Born in Orange County Virginia not far from Monticello, James Madison came from the
same Virginia planter class as Jefferson. His father, James Madison Sr., owned about five-thousand
acres of land that were cultivated by a large population of slaves.110 Madison grew up in this
environment, eventually leaving to attend what would later be called Princeton and enter into a
prominent place in Virginia’s politics. From this position he would become embroiled in the U.S.
war of independence and the creation of the United States constitution, eventually grappling with
the implications of Latin American independence both as President of the United States and as a
confidant of James Monroe.
Madison’s thoughts on representative government were focused around his mistrust of ‘the
people’s’ ability to govern themselves. Entering the constitutional convention in 1787, Madison
brought this mistrust into his roles as an important thinker behind the United States Constitution
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and as a federalist defender of the resulting document. In Federalist 10, Madison stated that “it may
well happen that the public voice, pronounced by the representatives of the people, will be more
consonant to the public good than if pronounced by the people themselves, convened for the
purpose.”111 Even in the United States, Madison believed that groups of people should not be relied
upon to act responsibly and that government should be structured to mitigate the harm these groups
might cause. There is no reason to believe this same concern would not be a factor in how Madison
thought about representative government in Latin America.
Indeed, writing about the Spanish and Portuguese populations on the other side of the
Atlantic, Madison declared they “need still further light & heat too from the American example
before they will be a Match for the armies, the intrigues & the bribes of their Enemies, the treachery
of their leaders, and what is most of all to be dreaded, their Priests & their Prejudices.”112 While this
statement focuses on the Iberian population, it mirrors the Black Legend to which Jefferson also
subscribed and, therefore, Madison’s doubts about the “Priests” and “Prejudices” of the Iberian
Catholic population assuredly transferred to the Latin American colonial populace. In a separate
letter Madison declared that “in the Papal System, Government and Religion are in a manner
consolidated, & that is found to be the worst of Govts.”113 The new South American states,
maintaining the Catholic faith they were colonized under, would fall within this categorization.
Therefore as Madison confronted South American independence, he did so not only doubting the
self-governing ability of all groups, but especially doubting the ability of Catholic populations.
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This confrontation began with his role as Secretary of State for then President Jefferson, but
continued through his own presidency. Writing just over a month after his inauguration, Madison
told Jefferson that France “must be equally aware of the importance of our relations to Spanish
America” and that “the most probable source of conflict will be in his [Napoleon’s] extending the
principle on which he required a prohibition of the Trade with St. Domingo to the case of the Spanish
Colonies.”114 Madison, therefore, entered the presidency with a clear sense of the value of Spanish
America to the United States, especially with regard to trade between the two regions. Two and a
half years later, in 1811 Madison wrote to Joel Barlow that “Venezuala however has thrown off this
mask, [of “nominal adherence to Ferdinand”] has communicated to us its declaration of
Independence, and solicits our acknowledging it by receiving a Pub. Minister &c.”115 This was one of
Madison’s first statements about South American independence and, while it would be a part of the
politics Madison dealt with as President, with the start of the War of 1812 the issue of South
American independence declined in relative importance. Additionally, due to continuous efforts to
acquire the East Florida peninsula and other complicating factors, U.S. support of South America
was delayed until 1822. For these reasons much of what Madison says about independence is located
in the correspondence after his presidency.116
In his retirement Madison returned to his plantation at Montpellier where he continued to
oversee its operations and correspond with his various political connections, including Thomas
Jefferson and James Monroe. Similar to Jefferson, Madison’s information about the situation in
South America would have come from these letters and the newspapers passing information from
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the coast through to the interior. Indeed, in a letter to Jefferson, Madison notes his intention to pass
on some of Alexander von Humboldt’s “draughts, or other maps”117 that were sent to Washington
but were bound for Monticello. Madison was cued into the same networks of information as
Jefferson, participated in the same revolutionary moment, and, like Jefferson, was Secretary of State
before becoming President. However his reaction to Latin American independence, while similar to
Jefferson’s in certain respects, is also characterized by distinct differences. It is this unique reaction,
and its comparative counterparts, that the remainder of this chapter will focus on.
Madison’s Thoughts
As has been noted, in 1811 Madison wrote to Joel Barlow in response to the Venezuelan
declaration of independence and the structure of this letter highlights a strategic approach that
consistently guides Madison’s perspective on Latin American revolutions. After noting that
Venezuela sent a public minister to the United States to solicit recognition and that the revolution in
Mexico was ongoing, Madison shifts to a strategic analysis noting that “in what manner G.B. [Great
Britain] will proceed in the case of Venezuela, & other districts following its example does not yet
appear.”118 He goes on to outline the possible reactions that Spain will have to these events before
shifting to the question of “E. Florida” and “the game she will play with Cuba.”119 Upon first
hearing of Venezuela’s revolution, a revolution for independence similar to that of the United States,
Madison’s initial reaction was to ponder the strategic effects of this revolution rather than its
connection to the principles upon which Madison’s constitution and country were based. This focus
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on strategy, as will be shown in this and the ensuing sections, defines Madison’s perspective on Latin
American revolutions.
Madison’s strategic focus did not mean that principled rhetoric was wholly absent from his
writings. In 1822 he wrote to Monroe defending his principled position after Joaquin de Anduaga,
then Spanish Minister to the United States,120 accused the U.S. of waiting to diplomatically recognize
an independent Spanish America until after the “cessation of Florida was secured.”121 In this letter
Madison declared that:
An historical view of the early sentiments expressed here in favor of our neighbors, the
successive steps openly taken, manifesting our sympathy with their cause, & our anticipation
of its success, more especially our declarations of neutrality towards the contending parties
as engaged in a civil, not an insurrectionary, war, would shew the world that we never
concealed the principles that governed us.122
Here Madison clearly believes that the United States’ position throughout the revolutionary period
in Latin America was visibly guided by principles, principles which, in his own words, were “in favor
of our neighbors,” the newly independent Latin American states. This principled language continues
into several other letters he wrote around this time. Writing to Monroe a year later about Canning’s
proposal, Madison referenced the “great struggle of the Epoch between liberty and despotism” and
the United States’ “sympathies with their [the “Revolutionized Colonies”] liberties & independence.”
123
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against Mexican independence were “confederated agst. the rights of man and the reforms of
nations.”125 It would seem, then, that principles consistently run through Madison’s thinking about
Latin American revolutions.
However, when read in their entirety these letters show that principles are given relatively
little weight in comparison to Madison’s strategic analysis and that they are oftentimes focused
around the United States rather than on the prospects of a representatively governed Latin America.
Writing to Jefferson in 1809, Madison declared that “the difficulty most likely to threaten
our relations with France lies in the effort she may make to render us in some way subservient to the
reduction of Spanish America; particularly by withholding our commerce.”126 In a letter to William
Pinkney, Madison said that “the position of Cuba gives the United States so deep an interest in the
destiny, even, of that Island, that although they might be an inactive, they could not be a satisfied
spectator of its falling under any European Government, which might make a fulcrum of that
position against the commerce and security of the United States.”127 These letters demonstrate
Madison’s appraisal of the importance the Latin American region played in the United States’
commercial and security interests. While Cuba was not a space of revolution, with the Napoleonic
invasion of Iberia the United States experienced a commercial windfall from the general opening of
the Latin American region to non-imperial trade. In addition to shipping vast quantities of
foodstuffs and other goods to Latin America, the U.S. had an interest in expanding its military
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presence in strategically important locales.128 Madison was keenly aware of the commercial and
military expansion Latin American independence enabled and this is what he referred to when he
highlighted the United States’ “deep interest” in a good relationship with Latin America. In fact, the
very word “interest” had a specific connotation central to Madison’s political philosophy. Historian
Gordon Wood notes in his essay “Interests and Disinterestedness in the Making of the
Constitution” that the founders “knew too well about ‘interest,’ which Madison defined ‘in the
popular sense’ as the ‘immediate augmentation of property and wealth.’”129 When Madison declared
that the United States had a “deep interest” in relations with Latin America, it was an interest that he
himself defined as centered around material gain.
After this commercially centered phrase, in this same letter to Monroe Madison ended his
justification of U.S. action by outlining the increased threat the “Great Powers” would pose if they
controlled the resources of Latin America. Here, we see Madison's initial appeal to principles morph
into a strategic focus which continues throughout the rest of the letter. Latin America is introduced
as a cause of liberty and independence, but quickly becomes an area of profit whose defeat would
result in a grave threat to the United States. The ensuing page of strategic analysis about the various
positions of Great Britain and Spain serves to highlight the relative lack of importance a free Spanish
America had for Madison in comparison to the strategic intricacies of the situation and the possible
benefits the United States could accrue. This compositional trend, of opening with a small measure
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of principled support for Latin America before focusing on the United States and moving to a more
strategic focus, is a trend that continues into the next decade of Madison’s letters.
For example, in the midst of the 1822 debate surrounding whether the U.S. should
diplomatically recognize the Latin American states, Madison wrote to Monroe and defended the role
principles played in U.S. action toward Latin America, before shifting his focus to the U.S. stating
that “altho’ there may be no danger of hostile consequences from the Recognising act, it is desirable
that our Republic should stand fair in the eyes of the world, not only for its own sake, but for that of
Republicanism itself.”130 Here Madison’s previously stated principled commitment to the Latin
American states contrastes with his reality, in which the reputation of the United States is declared to
be central to the wellbeing of “Republicanism itself.” It was the United States, rather than the
prospects for the creation of new republics in Latin America, that was the primary focus of
Madison’s assessment of what is best for “republicanism” as a principle. Madison then begins to
look at the situation strategically, analysing the “possible collisions with Spain on the Ocean, & the
backing she may receive from some of the great powers friendly or unfriendly to us.”131
Immediately after defending the United States’ principled commitment to Latin American
independence, Madison positions the United States at the crux of the entire category of
republicanism and goes on to analyze how the situation resulting from recognition could affect the
wellbeing of the United States and its relations to other nations.
In his October letter to Monroe which would contribute to the formation of the Monroe
Doctrine, Madison declared that “in the great struggle of the Epoch between liberty and despotism,
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we owe it to ourselves to sustain the former in this hemisphere at least.”132 The ‘struggle of principles’
is, in actuality, a conflict Madison views through the lens of what the United States owes ‘to
themselves,’ rather than what it might owe the Latin American revolutionizing colonies as a fellow
former colony and proponent of representative government. Later on in this letter, Madison said
that:
The professions we have made to these neighbors, our sympathies with their liberties &
independence, the deep interest we have in the most friendly relations with them, and the
consequences threatened by a command of their resources by the Great Powers
confederated agst. the rights & reforms, of which we have given so conspicuous & pervasive
an example, all unite in calling for our efforts to defeat the meditated crusade.133
This passage is important because in it Madison outlines the reasons that the United States should
take action to defeat the “mediated crusade.” While he does attribute some influence to the ideas of
liberty and independence, this is immediately followed by the “interest” the United States has in
relating to these neighbors and the danger of the “Great Powers” gaining access to the resources of
Latin America. Behind Madison’s language of the “deep interest” is the reality of what this meant,
namely commercial and political benefits.
This same approach characterizes Madison’s 1823 letter to Richard Rush in which he wrote
“our principles & our sympathies, the stand we have taken in their behalf, the deep interest we have
in friendly relations with them, and even our security agst. the Great Powers”134 motivate accepting
the Canning’s proposal. Here again “interest” appears as a crucial reason for U.S. action as does the
“security” of the United States against the threat from the Great Powers. What is striking about this
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letter, however, is the clear process of strategic calculation that immediately follows this statement.
Madison proclaimed that:
The good that wd. result to the World from such an invitation [Canning’s invitation] if
accepted, and the honor to our Country even if declined, outweigh the sacrifices that would
be required, or the risks that wd. be incurred. With the British fleets & fiscal resources
associated with our own we should be safe agst. the rest of the World, and at liberty to
pursue whatever course might be prescribed by a just estimate of our moral & political
obligations.135
Madison’s use of “outweigh” is noteworthy because it emphasizes the strategic calculation central to
his approach. While he might support Latin American independence in principle, that support is
subservient to strategic calculation and it is the freedom of action this proposal would give the
United States, rather than the freedom it would bring to Latin America, which is the focus of the
latter half of this passage. Similar to Jefferson, this freedom of action can be connected to the
possibility for territorial expansion and the third chapter will extrapolate on this connection.
Furthermore, this passage highlights that in Madison’s mind U.S. action should be
conditional on a low cost. In an earlier letter to Monroe, Madison stated his belief that if the United
States could get France and Russia to support Spanish American independence, the “great work of
its emancipation would then be compleated per saltum;136 for Great Britain could not hold back if so
disposed, and Spain would have no choice but acquiescence.”137 This statement is followed by more
strategic analysis about Britain centered around impressment and Canada. The structure here is
striking because, after outlining a path for the guaranteed independence of Spanish America,
Madison does not acknowledge the principled implications of this, but immediately moves on to the
broader strategic landscape in which this prospect exists. In combination with his 1823 statement
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about the benefits of “British fleets & fiscal resources,” this passage demonstrates Madison’s distinct
preference for action when it incurs little to no cost on the United States.
Madison’s approach to Latin American revolution was characterized by a preferencing of the
strategic concerns of the United States over the principled issues involved in these revolutions. The
principles Madison cited were often then related not to the revolutionizing Spanish colonies, but to
the wellbeing of the United States. For Madison, principles were either subservient to strategic
concerns or replaced with them. Madison’s writings on the situation in Latin America are
proportionally dominated by strategic concerns, with principled issues being rare and oftentimes
related to the United States rather than its neighbors. However there is one final peculiarity to
Madison’s viewpoint: his focus on independence rather than representative government.
As a designer of the U.S. constitution, one would expect Madison to have a great deal to say
about the prospects for, and progress toward, representative government in Latin America. This is
not the case. Writing to the Marquis de Lafayette in 1826, Madison stated his opinion that “Bolivar
appears to have given a Constitution to the new State in Peru, of a countenance not altogether
belonging to the American family. I have not yet seen its details; whether it shews him an apostate,
or the people there, in his view, too benighted as yet for self-government, may possibly be a
question.”138 Here Madison says that Peru’s constitution is not in accordance with the “American
family,” but this statement is notable because Madison says little else about what would constitute an
“American” governmental design. This is seemingly the only direct reference made in his
correspondence to the issue of whether the governments in Latin America would be representative
and, if so, what specific design that representative government would take and if it would be viable.
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This absence is striking and becomes more pronounced when it is connected to a letter Madison
wrote to the Marquis six years earlier.
In this earlier letter, Madison said that “free states seem indeed to be propagated in Europe,
as rapidly as new States are on this side of the Atlantic.”139 Madison’s language crafts a distinction
between the “free” states in Europe and “new” states in Latin America, new but seemingly not free.
If this is the case, why would Madison not have more to say about the ‘un-freedom’ of the new
American states? The answer arrives in the language he uses in his other letters. In his 1823 letter to
Rush, Madison declared his support for “defeating the efforts of the Holy Alliance to restore our
Independent neighbors to the condition of Spanish Provinces.”140 Then in his 1823 letter to Monroe,
he outlined the “sympathies with their liberties & independence”141 while never specifying the cause
of representative government. In fact, in his 1822 letter to Monroe, Madison explicitly mentioned
“republicanism”142 only in the context of the United States, even though immediately beforehand he
was discussing the Mexican revolution and the South American revolutions more broadly. Madison’s
omission cannot be boiled down to ignorance. Jefferson himself wrote about the prospect of
representative government in Latin America, and Madison, as a designer of the constitution, ought
to have even more to say on the prospect of his representative model being applied to other newly
independent regions. The explanation, then, must be that whether or not Latin America was
representatively governed did not concern Madison so long as it was independent.
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This reasoning is evidenced by how Madison talks about the 1817 revolution in
Pernambuco, Brazil. In 1817 the state of Pernambuco, then controlled by the Portuguese monarch,
revolted, declared its independence, and proclaimed itself a republic. Writing about this event,
Madison worried about the reaction of European leaders to the revolt:
The struggle of the Spanish part of it having the appearance of shaking off a foreign yolk,
appeals merely to the interest & sympathy of those Sovereigns. That in the Brazils, may be
viewed by them as an attack on a domestic throne.143
Here Madison distinguishes between revolutions of independence and those which are more
focused on a domestic separation which, in the case of Pernambuco, was partly with the goal of
establishing a republic. Furthermore, in the same letter Madison issues his regrets “that any
difficulties should have arisen with Portugal, the only recognized nation, beside ourselves, on this
Hemisphere.”144 Rather than the revolution in Pernambuco being a reason for celebrating the
expansion of republicanism in the Western Hemisphere, it had the opposite effect: causing Madison
strategic concern as to the European reaction and regret that it had put a strain on the United States’
relationship with Portugal. Madison assuredly knew about the republican rhetoric surrounding
Pernambuco, its prevalence in the newspapers and popular discourse would have made his
ignorance of this quite unlikely.145 In spite of this, Madison drew a distinction between the Spanish
revolutions, which were focused around the question of independence, and the Pernambuco
revolution which, while “domestic,” was centered largely on the question of representative
government. Here Madison was analyzing the possible reactions of European monarchs, but this
analysis precisely proves his indifference to representative government in Latin America. Madison
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not only views this republican revolution through a distinctly strategic lens, but worries that it will
have a negative effect on the Spanish revolutions of independence. In essence, the republican revolt
in Pernambuco is a worrying occurrence because it threatens the independence of the Spanish colonies
elsewhere in the hemisphere.
The French Revolution and the Question of Race
Madison’s perspective on Latin American revolutions was characterized by a mixture of
principles and strategy focused around U.S. political and commercial interests. The previous section
sought to emphasize the prevalence of strategy over principles, but this prevalence becomes notable
only when this perspective on Latin American revolutions is positioned against Madison’s reaction
to the French revolution. This comparison to the French Revolution reveals not only the degree to
which strategy dominated Madison’ perspective on Latin American revolutions, but also the reason
behind this domination. This section will first focus on the comparative prevalence of strategy in the
Latin American case before moving on to the racial lens motivating this strategic approach.
Writing to Jean Marie Roland in April 1793, Madison’s reaction to the French revolution was
comparatively enthusiastic. Madison proclaimed that “in the catalogue of sublime truths and
precious sentiments recorded in the revolution of France, none is more to be admired than the
renunciation of those prejudices which have perverted the artificial boundaries of nations into
exclusions of the philanthropy which ought to cement the whole into one great family”146 Here
Madison engages with the principles characterizing the French revolution in a way he never did for
Latin American revolutions. Moreover, Madison is not only supportive, but admiring of the French
revolution and communicates a sense of unity with France in his declaration that the revolution is
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guiding nations into the “one great family” they ought to be. Madison went on to declare that “the
recitals of the act which you communicate contain the best comment on the great principle of
humanity: and in proportion as they speak the magnanimity of the French nation.”147 Madison’s
characterizing of the “recitals of the act” as containing the “best comment on the great principle of
humanity” makes a universal and deeply principled claim that is almost entirely absent from his
language surrounding Latin American revolutions. In fact, when Madison mentions a universal
principle in the context of Latin American revolution, the principle is in connection with the United
States rather than the revolting colonies, including his statement that “altho’ there may be no danger
of hostile consequences from the Recognising act, it is desirable that our Republic should stand fair
in the eyes of the world, not only for its own sake, but for that of Republicanism itself.”148 Here it is
the reputation of the United States, rather than the act of recognizing Latin America, which is
republican whereas the French context involved the “great principle of humanity.” Clearly principles
play a much stronger role in Madison’s perspective toward France in comparison to Latin America.
In the same letter Madison went on to personalize his statements, saying that “for myself I
feel these sentiments with all the force which that reflection can inspire; and I present them with
peculiar satisfaction as a citizen of the U.S.”149 Madison not only focuses on principles with a
specificity and praise that never enters his language about Latin America, but he also goes out of his
way to connect them with his own feelings. Furthermore, in contrast to his Latin American letters,
strategy is wholly absent from his letter to Roland despite there being a variety of contemporary
strategic uncertainties which Roland might have been able to speak to. Madison’s reaction to the
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French Revolution was, therefore, markedly different than his reaction to Latin American
revolutions, being less strategic, more principled, and generally more enthusiastic.
Madison also believed that a certain perspective on the French Revolution was the correct
one for an American citizen to hold. Writing to Jefferson a few weeks after his letter to Roland,
Madison commented that Edmund Randolph’s “sentiments are right & firm on the French Revoln.,
and in other respects I discovered no symptoms of heresy.”150 Madison not only describes the
sentiments as correct, but implies that were Randolph’s views divergent from what they should be,
they would qualify as “heresy.” This word choice highlights that, for Madison, the French
Revolution was a quasi-religious cause, thereby reinforcing the connection he makes between this
revolution and its ‘higher principles.’ Madison expected that other Americans support the revolution
with the same verve and purity as himself, an element completely lacking in his approach to Latin
American revolutions.
The contrast becomes most clear in Madison’s letter to Jefferson written in September of
1793. This letter concerns American citizens’ reactions to the disagreeable actions of the French
Minister to the United States, Edmond-Charles Genet. Here Madison writes:
The only antidote for their poison [those who tried to use Genet to divide the U.S. and
France] is to distinguish between the nation & its agent, between principles and events; and
to impress the well meaning with the fact that the enemies of Prance & of Liberty are at
work to lead them from their honorable connection with these into the arms and ultimately
into the Government, of G.B.151
While Madison does attribute a strategic effect to “their poison,” he also emphasizes the distinction
between “principles and events” regarding the French Revolution. Here, Madison believed that the
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principles were not only separate, but were more important than the events in question. In the case
of the French Revolution, he prioritized principles over concrete events and advocated that others
do the same.
In response to American anger toward Genet, Madison felt obliged to compose a “train of
ideas”152 to help structure county meetings on the issue. In this composition, Madison used language
similar to some found in his discussion of Latin America, calling the French revolution a “severe &
glorious contest in which it is now engaged for its own liberty” that “must be peculiarly interesting
to the wishes, the friendship & the sympathy of the people of America.”153 This language is in his
reactions to both revolutions, but Madison continued by saying that “all attempts which may be
made in whatever form or disguise to alienate the good will of the people of America from the cause
of liberty & repubn Govt in F. have a tendency to weaken ye affection to the free principles of ye
own Govt, and manifest designs wch ought to be narrowly watched & seasonably countered.”154
This passage presents the most crucial distinction between how Madison treats the French and Latin
American revolutions. In the context of France, Madison directly references the cause of “repubn
Govt” in a manner totally absent from his correspondence surrounding Latin American revolutions.
However, Madison goes even further, directly tying the republican cause in France with the
wellbeing of republican government in the United States. As opposed to the Latin American case,
where Madison does not mention republican government and where the question of republicanism
revolves solely around the United States, the dual republics of the U.S. and France are linked such
that not supporting French republicanism is akin to not supporting U.S. republicanism. Indeed,
Madison went on in the letter to emphasize that the United States and France are “mutually attached
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to the cause of liberty” and that France is “an example that may open the eyes of all mankind to
their natl & pol rights.”155 This equitable mutualism Madison approaches the French revolution with
is nowhere to be found in his discussion of Latin American revolutions. Whereas Madison sees the
United States as the focus of republican principles in the Latin American case and approaches those
revolutions with a focus on U.S. strategic interests, the French revolution is a beacon of universal
principles that ties the U.S. and France together. With this comparison, the degree to which strategic
interest, as opposed to republican principles, guided Madison’s approach to Latin American
revolution becomes clear.
Why would Madison so vehemently support the republican cause of France, going out of his
way to separate principles and events, and yet prioritize U.S. strategy so completely with regards to
Latin American revolutions? While there were a variety of situational differences, the key difference
becomes clear when Madison describes his thoughts on the Latin American population. Writing to
Frances Wright about the question of abolition, Madison declared that certain “physical
peculiarities” make the “incorporation”156 of freed slaves into the white population impossible. He
goes on to specify that “these peculiarities, it wd. seem are not of equal force in the South American
States, owing in part perhaps to a former degradation produced by colonial vassalage, but principally
to the lesser contrast of colours. The difference is not striking between that of many of the Spanish
& Portuguese Creoles & that of many of the mixed breed.”157 This comment reaches its full meaning
in connection to Madison’s answer to Jedidiah Morse’s question: “what is their [free blacks’] general
character with respect to industry and order?” Madison responds that their character is “generally
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idle and depraved; appearing to retain the bad qualities of the slaves with whom they continue to
associate, without acquiring any of the good ones of the whites, from whom [they] continue
separated by prejudices.”158 Madison sees Latin America as a region populated predominantly by
persons who are not white, and also sees freed slaves as a population characterized by personal
defects. As has already been stated, Latin American revolutions were deeply connected to
emancipatory efforts so, when Madison looked south to Latin America, he saw a population that
was not white and, therefore, a population whose character with regards to “industry and order” was
questionable at best. This type of population might, in Madison’s mind, be wholly undeserving or
incapable of self-government to the point where that prospect was not even worth mentioning.
While racism might begin to explain why self-government played a lesser role in Madison’s
views on Latin America, it does not fully explain why the strategic lens so completely replaced a
principled viewpoint. Madison’s upbringing and position within the Virginian planter class provide a
reason for this replacement. Madison spent his entire life as a slave owner, viewing persons of color
through the lens of personal utility: how their existence might benefit himself. When Madison went
to the Continental Congress he took his slave Billey with him but, after the convention wrote his
father to declare that:
On a view of all circumstances I have judged it most prudent not to force Billey back to Va.
even if could be done….I am persuaded his mind is too thoroughly tainted to be a fit
companion for fellow slaves in Virga….I do not expect to get near the worth of him; but
cannot think of punishing him by transportation merely for coveting that liberty for which
we have paid the price of so much blood, and have proclaimed so often to be the right, &
worthy the pursuit, of every human being.159
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Madison believed it impossible to bring Billey back to Virginia, believed liberty was a right that all
human beings deserved, and yet still sold Billey in Philadelphia despite a limited financial return.
Even when he had the least to lose from freeing Billey and clear principled reasons for doing so,
Madison still viewed him through a lens of personal utility, acting only upon what he could gain
from Billey’s existence.
Madison’s lifetime identity as a slaveholder, combined with this demonstration of his lens of
personal utility in Billey’s case, suggest the reasons behind Madison’s strategic approach to Latin
American revolution. When Madison looked south, he not only saw populations he considered “idle
and depraved,”160 but also saw populations of color who looked, to him, much like the slaves he had
lived his entire life viewing through this lens of utility.161 Madison approached Latin American
revolutions with a focus on strategic self-interest because this was the same way he had always
approached populations of color, wondering how they might be useful to him. The French
population, being predominantly white, were a ‘good in themselves’ and so his support of their
revolution was principled while the Latin American revolutions, with largely non-white populations,
were a ‘means’ to Madison’s self-interested strategic ends. This analysis helps explain Madison’s
focus on Latin American independence over representative government: independence lead to
commerce and European exclusion from the Western hemisphere that benefited the United States
and so was a principle strategically worth supporting while representative government, especially to a
man who deeply mistrusted the ability of people to govern themselves (to say nothing of this ability
in non-white populations) might be a strategic liability or, at the very least, a principle not worth
focusing on in comparison to the more beneficial independence.
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Madison and Jefferson
Madison, then, saw Latin American revolutions in a self-interested strategic manner, almost
entirely unconcerned with the success or possibility of representative government in Latin America.
This perspective is different than Jefferson’s, which included a great deal of speculation about
representative government in Latin America. Jefferson doubted the ability of former Spanish
colonial populations to effectively govern themselves, but was willing to overlook this doubt
depending on the advantages this exception would have for the United States. Additionally,
Jefferson’s position was tied with his desire to preserve the lucrative profits of slavery and his desire
for territorial expansion. Like Jefferson, Madison’s position was influenced by the self-interest of the
U.S. and his identity as a Virginia slaveholder, even if in a different way. While self-interest guided
Jefferson’s principles and their application, outside of a few small references that constitute little
more than a meaningless refrain in comparison to the French revolution, Madison approached Latin
American revolution with very little concern for the prospects of representative government. Instead
Madison focused almost exclusively on the strategic benefits and harms these revolutions might
present for the United States. While it may have manifested differently, in Jefferson’s case
undergirding his principled outlook, in Madison’s supplanting his principles for a strategic focus, the
self-interest of the United States, focused on expansion, firmly guided how both figures approached
Latin American revolution.
Jefferson and Madison, articulator of the supposed principles of the United States and
designer of the government to enact those principles, both approached Latin American revolutions
not as an expansion of these principles, but as an opportunity for U.S. gain. Self interest, rather than
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a commitment to representative government, provided the foundation for how these ‘founding
fathers’ viewed Latin American revolution and their perspectives would, on October 17, 1823,162
gain an importance beyond themselves.
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Chapter III-Monroe and his Doctrine
The Monroe Doctrine has undergone a critical re-interpretation, with many accepting that it
operated more as a geo-political document rather than being centered on principle. While certainly
valid, to fully understand the significance of the Monroe Doctrine in United States’ history it must
be analyzed in light of the ‘founding fathers’’ opinions regarding Latin American representative
government and in conjunction with an examination not just of what the Monroe Doctrine was, but
of what it was not. This reading makes clear that the American Creedal narrative would expect
Monroe to choose a different path, while in reality the Monroe Doctrine was rooted in a denial of
the importance of representative government in Latin America.
*

*

*

The Road to 1823
There is a tendency to look back on United States history and see the progress of this
country as inevitable; however until 1815 the very existence of the United States was consistently
uncertain. In 1783, the United States won independence but that by no means meant the country
was stable. Independence did not, for instance, mean that the union between the states was
guaranteed and during the first decades of the country’s existence, its leaders spent a great deal of
energy worrying that the union would split. After the Articles of Confederation proved inadequate,
the drafting and ratification of a new constitution became the focus of the country’s leadership and
it was not until 1790 that the last of the original colonies ratified the document. Even after
ratification, westward expansion proved a divisive subject, especially with regard to slavery. Many of
the original Atlantic states worried about the decline of their relative power as new states were
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added.163 With the new system of government still being adjusted in accordance to experience and
crisis, as Jefferson and Madison assumed the presidency the continued internal cohesion of the
country was very much up for debate. This is not to mention the country’s finances which, after the
accumulation of large war debts, were in dire straits.
More worrying was the latent British threat. While the United States won the 1776 war, the
final treaty was hardly in its favor. Britain never pulled back from its forts on the United States’
northwestern border. In fact, it used these forts to support Native American raids into U.S. territory.
164

This, coupled with the continued harassment of U.S. shipping, highlights the United States’

precarious situation. The British military was far superior to that of the United States and, while the
United States had won the war, the possibility of a British re-incursion remained daunting in the
minds of the founders.
Britain was not, however, the only threat facing the U.S. The French revolution and U.S.
refusal to pay its war debt led to the “quasi-war” with France between 1798 and 1800.165 This
revolution and subsequent war distanced the United States from its earlier ally and put yet another
strain on its cohesion and stability. The last years of the 18th century were anything but stable.
The dawn of a new century did not, however, inaugurate a new existential certainty. It was
only after the conclusion of the War of 1812, otherwise known as the Second War of Independence,
that one could gain confidence in the future existence of the U.S. That this war is now known by
this other name highlights that before 1815 the United States was threading the needle under the
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British threat and remained, in large part, an independent but highly economically integrated and
diplomatically coerced piece in the British empire. The success of British troops in the war, including
the burning of the U.S. Capitol, reveals that the existential uncertainty in the country’s early years
was merited. However, at the conclusion of the war, Britain finally pulled back from its threatening
position in the Northwest and the continuance of the United States began to seem more certain.
While the Treaty of Ghent would continue to be debated between the two nations, Monroe’s speech
in 1823 notes the ongoing negotiations over the realized meaning and enforcement of the treaty,
these disagreements would not spark a similarly dire conflict. After the war the United States
fortified its coastline,166 thereby decreasing the threat of foreign incursion.
This was the condition of the U.S. through Jefferson’s presidency and most of Madison’s.
Burdened by debt, grappling with internal debates and political strife, and constantly threatened by
British might and French military power, the United States had little ability to take proactive action,
especially in the international sphere. Perhaps most importantly, the chaos resulting from the
Napoleonic wars occupied a great deal of the U.S. government's attention. Jefferson’s embargo and
its ensuing consequences, coupled with Madison’s War of 1812, left the United States responding to
crises instead of taking additional foreign policy measures to influence the surrounding world.
Jefferson and Madison assuredly had actions they would have taken had circumstances not forced
their hands, but the energy of the United States government was preoccupied for much of the time
the Virginia dynasty held power.
The situation began to change with Monroe’s entrance into the presidency and the dawn of
the 1820s. By this time internal cohesion had increased with the decline of the Federalist party,
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temporarily ending partisan strife and leading to this period’s denomination as the ‘Era of Good
Feelings.’ Monroe’s speech in December 1823, in which he outlines what would later be named the
Monroe Doctrine, provides an excellent picture of exactly how he and his administration saw the
wellbeing of the country they presided over. Though Monroe’s speech outlines points of contention
with Britain and Russia, there is no rhetoric describing a probable conflict and these disagreements
were the subject of peaceful negotiations rather than increasing tensions. He stated that “the actual
condition of the public finances more than realizes the favorable anticipations that were entertained
of it at the opening of the last session of Congress” estimating that there would be a surplus of nine
million dollars at the start of the new year.167 Furthermore, Monroe said that “The state of the
Army….has now attained a high degree of perfection.”168 Lastly, at the end of his speech Monroe
declared that “our population has expanded in every direction, and new States have been
established….This expansion of our population and accession of new States to our Union have had
the happiest effect on all its highest interests.”169 After forty years of independence, the United
States was diplomatically, financially, militarily, and politically stable. This stability allowed for
westward expansion and prosperity which, in turn, augmented the very stability that created it.170
None of this is to say that there were not dilemmas or worries during this period, but that relative to
the history preceding it, Monroe presided over a period of remarkable stability.

167

Ibid.
Ibid.
169
Ibid.
170
All of this stability was, however, limited to certain privileged segments of the population. Slaves, native peoples, and
many other groups saw their lives constantly upended and characterized by suffering in the creation of this stability.
While this suffering is not to be ignored, in this case I am attempting to access the national condition as perceived by
figures who were, incontestably, the privileged and so this paragraph’s approach, while exclusionary, is analytically
necessary to establish this particular critique of these individuals.
168

71
`As these broader strokes of U.S. history were playing out, the United States’ relationship
with revolutionary South America remained somewhat stagnant. Jefferson’s presidency had
established that, in the opinion of the United States, “Spain should be left in possession of her
American colonies, since they could not be in better hands until the United States was ready to take
those that it needed.”171 While the United States looked covetously at its southern neighbors, it
lacked the capability to take decisive action on these impulses and its expansionism was relegated
toward the acquisition of Florida and, eventually, the Louisiana Territory. The Latin American
independence movements began at the very end of Jefferson’s presidency, leaving the responsibility
of dealing with these movements with his friends, mentees, and successors: James Madison and
James Monroe.172
Madison’s ability to influence the situation in Latin America would be severely limited by the
War of 1812. When he entered the presidency, Madison initially stuck to a strict policy of neutrality
with regard to the southern revolutions. Whitaker discusses how Madison “held unofficial
correspondence”173 with the agents of revolution lobbying for support, while also permitting these
individuals to purchase “munitions”174 to be shipped southward. This open policy to munitions sales
was extended to Spanish officials residing in America as well.175 Though neutrality was Madison’s
position, the uncertain situation necessitated some response by the United States. What resulted is
known as the “No Transfer Principle of 1811” which stated that the United States would not allow
any territory in the Americas to pass from the hands of one colonial power to another. The
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statement declared that “a due regard to their own safety compels them [the United States] to
provide under certain contingencies, for the temporary occupation of the said territory” and that this
territory would be held “subject to a future negotiation.”176 In his book No God But Gain, Stephen
Chambers notes that this statement was one of the foundations for the establishment of the Monroe
Doctrine twelve years later.177
Although this was a bold statement, suggesting that Madison sought to take action focused
on the Latin American revolutions, this effort was brought to a stop by the War of 1812 during
which time the existential nature of the conflict prohibited the United States from taking such
action.178 Whitaker goes on to lay out the reasons for the “sacrifice” of the “interests of the United
States in Latin America….to its desire for territory.”179 He writes both that Canada and Florida were
“contiguous with the United States” and “familiar” while Latin America was relatively unknown, far
away, and seemed to be of less possible advantage to the United States. While the existential nature
of the war easily explains the United States’ inaction in Latin America better than these reasons, the
confluence of these factors meant that through the rest of Madison’s presidency the United States
took little action to influence the southern conflicts.
Monroe taking office, in combination with the end of the War of 1812 and the start of the
period of relative stability described earlier in this chapter, led to more definitive action culminating
in the decision to put forward the Monroe Doctrine. In his traditional historiographic treatment of
Monroe, Whitaker describes him as a “devout republican….[who] was fired by a missionary zeal for
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propagating the republican faith in foreign parts.”180 Whitaker’s view of Monroe will be subject to
critique later on in this chapter, suffice it to say that for all his “zeal,” Monroe had a limited view of
Latin American liberty. Writing to Andrew Jackson in 1818, Monroe declared that “by keeping the
Allies out of the quarrel, Florida must soon be ours and the Colonies must be independent, for if they cannot
beat Spain, they do not deserve to be free.”181 In addition to his clear focus on the self-interest of the
United States, in this case pertaining to the acquisition of Florida, Monroe also mirror’s Jefferson’s
opinion that to deserve freedom Latin America had to succeed in military conflict. Monroe,
therefore, did not consider it the job of the United States to interfere in this conflict, believing that
independence and representative government had to be earned through self-reliant bloodshed.182
If bloodshed was how freedom was earned, it would be earned with, and resisted by,
weapons and munitions of U.S. manufacture. While the United States would not send its own forces
into the conflict, it was also unwilling to cease its business with Spanish forces. Whitaker notes that
Monroe believed selling weapons to Spain, as well as to the Spanish American colonies, was the only
way to maintain neutrality and not “court….war….and ruin to the Spanish American cause.”183
While this may have been the case, it was also the case that the United States was making a good
deal of money selling weapons and supplies to both sides of the conflict, a reality that Latin America
would not forget once its independence was achieved and the United States sought to reposition
itself as an ever-present supporter of the revolutionary cause.
Part of this positioning involved, in 1822, U.S. diplomatic recognition of the new Latin
American states as independent and sovereign. While Monroe attempted to collaborate with Britain
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on joint recognition, in the end he recognized these nations unilaterally although how he went about
this recognition is telling. Whitaker himself remarks that “the national interest, not political idealism,
was the mainspring of that policy.”184 He reaches this conclusion as a result of Monroe’s initially
sending a U.S. minister only to Mexico, finding this surprising due to the newness and monarchical
character of the Mexican state. Whitaker goes on to say that Monroe believed that all American
states would eventually become republican and that Monroe hoped this would render his action less
offensive to the European powers.185 Regardless of the validity of this statement, with this maneuver
Monroe devalued representative government as a metric upon which United States policy would be
based.
The debate and path toward diplomatic recognition was long, however after this was
achieved Monroe began searching for another action the United States could take. Whitaker writes
that Monroe’s letters show “he was suffering keenly from the feeling that his administration lacked
popular support and that he attributed this lack to the absence of any great and pressing issue,
foreign or domestic, to focus public sentiment.”186 Post-recognition, with a newly secure nation, and
having achieved a longstanding goal of many Latin American advocates, Monroe now had a free
hand to take additional action to fire up public sentiment and, as will be shown, re-trench and
forward his and his predecessors’ long standing goals.
The Decision
The Monroe Doctrine was not the action the American Creedal narrative would lead one to
expect. Given the narrative’s focus on the spread of representative government abroad, the
self-interested and expansionist tint to the Monroe Doctrine directly contradicts this version of
184
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history. To understand this, one must look at the actions the United States did not take in
conjunction with, or in the place of, the Monroe Doctrine but which were open to it at the time,
given the strategic opening Monroe clearly knew he had and which this section will describe.
After communicating the core aspect of his doctrine, Monroe stated that “In the war
between those new Governments and Spain we declared our neutrality at the time of their
recognition, and to this we have adhered, and shall continue to adhere.”187 Monroe’s Doctrine did
not alter U.S. neutrality, and here Monroe specifically rejects such an alteration which would have, in
practice, led the United States to support its republican neighbors in their fight against Spanish
monarchy. This neutrality was not restricted to the avoidance of war for, as was stated earlier in this
chapter, part of Monroe’s neutrality entailed selling weapons to both sides of the conflict. Even as
Monroe declared the Americas free of additional European intrusion, he was allowing the sale of
weapons to a European power bent on an intrusion that, while outside of the bounds of the
doctrine, clearly went against his principle of an American system based on representative
government. Spain was in no position to pose a significant threat to the United State, nevertheless
Monroe made no moves to end a neutrality that was, ostensibly, based around this non-existent
threat and the wellbeing of the Latin American states which were striving for independence against
the flow of U.S. bullets.
Additionally, Monroe rejected all possibilities of alliances with the newly independent states.
Whitaker writes that “The idea that the American system was to be implemented by the negotiation
of inter-American alliances was a natural inference from Monroe’s message.”188 Indeed, after the
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1823 speech Columbia's minister in Washington, José María Salazar wrote to John Quincy Adams
asking how the United States would resist European interference, if the U.S. would enter into a
defensive alliance with Columbia, and if Spanish forces qualified as the kind of interference
Monroe’s address focused on?189 After a cabinet meeting, the administration’s reply was sent which,
among other things, downplayed the European threat and emphasized that should the doctrine be
violated, the United States was not obliged to go to war for it could only do so with Congressional
approval.190 Beyond these qualifications, the response also “showed that the traditional opposition
against entangling alliances had been carried over into the new Latin American policy.”191 Whitaker
goes on to note that Monroe “had never said that his system included cooperation with the new
states….Now that the threat from Europe was no longer causing great uneasiness at Washington,
the chief care of the administration was to avoid involvements with the new states that might prove
embarrassing at a later period.”192 Rather than engaging in a robust defense of representative
government through a system of alliances that his doctrine led Latin American states to infer and
propose, Monroe’s administration distinctly avoided this path. There was not, however, much
reason for doing so because though Washington’s farewell address emphasized the avoidance of
alliances in an era of European colonization, Monroe’s American system created a new space where
these alliances might have proved advantageous. Instead, Monroe refused these alliances based on
nebulous future complications.
These were a few of the other paths open to Monroe in the later part of 1823. Some, like
alterations to neutrality, were enthusiastically advocated for by members of Congress while others,
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like alliances, were put forward by the newly recognized Latin American nations themselves.
Nevertheless, in the end Monroe chose to put forward the doctrine for which he is now famous.
There is strong reason to believe these paths were open to Monroe due to the circumstances from
which his doctrine emerged. These circumstances and the process by which Monroe came to his
ultimate decision will be the subject of the remainder of this section.
The Monroe Doctrine was put forward after many years of hesitation on the part of the
United States. Indeed, in the lead up to recognition, Monroe wrote to Jonathan Russell that “the
object is to serve the provinces essentially, by promoting the independence of all, with the
establishment of free Republican Governments, and with that view, to obtain their recognition by
other powers, as soon as possible. If we alarm these powers, we may defeat our own objects.”193
Here Monroe was clearly concerned with how the European powers might react to U.S. action, and
yet a year and a half later Monroe would put forward his doctrine banning future European
colonization and systemic expansion in the Americas. Monroe’s nervousness in March 1822
contrasts with the brashness of the Monroe Doctrine. Where in 1822 he formalized a long
contemplated action, in 1823 Monroe leapt forward leading one to wonder why he felt comfortable
taking this action.
The Monroe Doctrine was not, in fact, sparked by Monroe or his administration but instead
was a mutation of a proposal made by George Canning, the British Secretary of Foreign Affairs, to
the U.S. emissary to Britain, Richard Rush.194 In 1823, Canning suggested that the United States and
Britain issue a joint declaration to warn “the European powers not to attempt the reconquest of
Spanish America or the transfer of any part of it from Spain to another power.”195 The proposal also
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contained a clause forbidding Britain and the United States from taking portions of Spanish America
for themselves. Unable to agree to the proposal himself, Rush sent word of the opportunity to
Monroe whose first step was to send letters to both Thomas Jefferson and James Madison asking
for their opinions on the matter.196 As Whitaker notes, the administrations of these three individuals
overlap with the entirety of the Latin American independence movements making this moment a
coming together not only of the Virginia Dynasty, but of the entire U.S. approach to the possibility
of Latin American independence and representative government.197
Jefferson’s letter, which has been analyzed earlier in this paper, noted that “this sets our
compass and points the course which we are to steer through the ocean of time opening on us.”198
Jefferson clearly sees Monroe’s decision in this moment as fortuitous of the future course of the
nation he helped to found, and as such had a great deal to say in the matter. Jefferson wrote that
“our endeavour should surely be, to make our hemisphere that of freedom. One nation, most of all,
could disturb us in this pursuit; she now offers to lead, aid, and accompany us in it….with her on
our side we need not fear the whole world.”199 Jefferson accurately portrays how meaningful
Canning’s proposal was, for it signalled a moment when U.S. action to separate the American sphere
from European influence was agreeable to the nation most able to usurp and resist such a
separation. This, in Jefferson’s words, presented a great opportunity for freedom.
However, as the first chapter of this project demonstrated, while Jefferson’s rhetoric may
have revolved around freedom, self-interest was the actual foundation upon which his politics were
built and this is clear in his letter to Monroe. First, Jefferson said that “its object [of the proposition]
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is to introduce and establish the American system, of keeping out of our land all foreign powers, of
never permitting those of Europe to intermeddle with the affairs of our nations.”200 Jefferson’s
possessive language here is telling, for although Canning’s proposal forbade U.S. acquisition of
Spanish American territory, Jefferson speaks of “our land” and “our nations.” These phrases
indicate that while he speaks of hemispheric freedom, Jefferson views the entirety of the hemisphere
as subject to the leadership of the United States and collaboration with Canning was a means to
legitimize and secure this leadership. After all, what could legitimize U.S. hemispheric leadership
more than its recognition by Britain, the nation to whom many Latin American nations already
looked for protection and commercial prosperity.201
Furthermore, Jefferson’s only qualm with the arrangement is revealed in his advice that “we
have first to ask ourselves a question. Do we wish to acquire to our own confederacy any one or
more of the Spanish provinces? I candidly confess, that I have ever looked on Cuba as the most
interesting addition which could ever be made to our system of States.202 While unstated, Jefferson’s
interest in Cuba was assuredly based in the vast wealth which the United States could gain through
ownership of the island and the lucrative slave-based plantation system that scholars have termed an
“agro-industrial graveyard.”203 In spite of his statement that Monroe’s question was “the most
momentous which has ever been offered to my contemplation since that of Independence,”204
Jefferson paused to contemplate the loss of the potential ownership of Cuba and its brutal slave
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economy. This, in and of itself, is telling of Jefferson’s approach to the trade off between liberty and
profit, but in the end Jefferson recommended that Monroe go along with Canning’s proposal.
Similar to Jefferson, Madison’s response mirrors the pre-existing pattern of his thoughts on
Latin America, in which strategy trumps principle. Noting the same advantage to cooperation which
Jefferson pointed out, Madison declared that:
The professions we have made to these neighbours, our sympathies with their liberties &
independence, the deep interest we have in the most friendly relations with them, and the
consequences threatened by a command of their resources by the Great Powers
confederated agst. the rights & reforms, of which we have given so conspicuous &
persuasive an example, all unite in calling for our efforts to defeat the meditated crusade.205
Just as he had throughout his writings on this subject, Madison starts with a focus on “these
neighbors” before moving on to the strategic threat the Great Powers could pose to the United
States if they commanded the resources of Latin America. While Jefferson emphasized the
momentousness of the occasion but in the end based his hesitations and justifications in U.S. self
interest, for Madison the question was firmly one of interest. This interest guided him, like Jefferson,
to advise Monroe to agree to the declaration provided an eye was kept on constitutional adherence.
However, before ending his letter Madison had one last question. He wrote asking “What is the
extent of Mr. Canning's disclaimer as to ‘the remaining possessions of Spain in America?’ Does it
exclude future views of acquiring Porto Rico &c, as well as Cuba? It leaves G. Britain free as I
understand it in relation to other Quarters of the Globe.”206 Focusing on Cuba like Jefferson had six
days earlier, Madison wonders whether there might be a way for the United States to make this
declaration and still expand into Cuba. It was assuredly for the same reasons.
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Monroe received these letters of advice from his fellow Virginia plantation owners and
promptly submitted them to his cabinet at the start of the meetings that would culminate in the
Monroe Doctrine. The significance of this cannot be overstated. While they might not have been in
the room, Jefferson and Madison’s opinions and biases were certainly present and held the full
weight of their former-presidential and already semi-mythological statuses. These letters, like their
authors, focused on the self-interest of the United States and so Monroe and his cabinet could move
toward a self-interested approach with the support of the author of the Declaration of
Independence and the ‘father of the constitution.’ This validation cannot be causally linked to
Monroe’s decision, but a careful examination of the Monroe Doctrine will reveal that it did
correspond to many of the patterns found in Jefferson and Madison’s thoughts on Latin American
republicanism, which they communicated to Monroe in these letters and, assuredly, in prior
conversations.
Importantly, the Monroe Doctrine was a unilateral statement rather than a bilateral one, with
the United States acting alone, without the cooperation of Britain or its navy. Accounts on exactly
why this is differ: with Whitaker arguing that Canning soured on the action he had proposed and
Chambers arguing that Monroe abandoned the prospect of a joint statement himself. Regardless of
the reason, Monroe makes his statement on behalf of the United States alone.
This statement, presented in his seventh annual message to Congress on December 2, 1823,
contains, as Arthur Whitaker points out, two parts: “the negative principle of non-colonization and
the positive principle of the American system” in addition to a warning to Europe not to violate
these principles.207 On non-colonization, Monroe declared that:
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The occasion has been judged proper for asserting, as a principle in which the rights and
interests of the United States are involved, that the American continents, by the free and
independent condition which they have assumed and maintain, are henceforth not to be
considered as subjects for future colonization by any European powers.208
Similar to Jefferson’s general approach to the Latin American question, Monroe’s language presents
a ‘principle’ that is firmly rooted in U.S. self interest. Monroe bases this “principle” not on the
well-being of a continent of newly free persons, but on the “rights and interests of the United
States.” The importance of this approach becomes clear with the ending of this sentence, in which
“future colonization by any European powers” is prohibited. As many scholars have noted, this
prohibition avoids restricting the possibility for future U.S. colonization in the Americas. While
Canning’s proposal would have restricted this, Monroe’s statement maintains an opening for U.S.
expansion. Nowhere in this section can the ‘grand moment for freedom’ that Jefferson described be
found; the non-colonization principle is plainly and self-admittingly centered on the self interest of
the United States.
Principled language can, however, be found in the second section of the Monroe Doctrine
which separates the “American system” from the “European system.” This is no coincidence for, as
Whitaker points out, “from Jefferson’s reply he [Monroe] took the idea of an American system
separate and distinct from the European system.”209 Monroe said that:
The political system of the allied powers is essentially different….from that of
America….We owe it, therefore, to candor and to the amicable relations existing between
the United States and those powers to declare that we should consider any attempt on their
part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and
safety.210
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This is the core of the Monroe Doctrine and what historians focus on most. That the contents of
Jefferson’s letter made it into such an important passage confirms the collaboration in this moment.
Continuing on the same theme, Monroe proclaimed that “we could not view any interposition for
the purpose of oppressing them [free Latin American states], or controlling in any other manner
their destiny, by any European power in any other light than as a manifestation of an unfriendly
disposition toward the United States.”211 This statement has often been read as based on the
principle of the two spheres which proceeded it, a reading which suggests that the difference
between the two systems informs the meaning of “unfriendly disposition.” The reality is that any
interference by European powers could constitute such a disposition for a host of other reasons.
Looking south, Monroe and his predecessors saw the opportunity for U.S. commercial and
territorial expansion and so any European action that might impede those prospects would,
assuredly, fall under the category of an unfriendly disposition. This, in fact, is how the doctrine
would be interpreted and utilized by U.S. leaders moving forward. Once again, what appears to be a
statement of principle is, in fact, carefully built to leverage the veneer of principle on behalf of the
self-interest of the United States.
The exclusionary message the Monroe Doctrine communicated to the European powers
indicates that, at this time, Monroe saw an opening for the United States to take dramatic action and
he chose to do so for the United States’ own self-interest. Regardless of whether Canning or
Monroe abandoned the joint proposal, in this proposal Monroe saw that Britain might tolerate
unilateral U.S. action and, freed from the proclamation Britain had planned, he chose the path most
advantageous to the United States and mimicked Britain’s proposal while leaving room for the
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United States to expand and colonize throughout the Americas. Indeed, this alleviated the concern
both Jefferson and Madison had that the joint-proclamation would prevent the United States from
acquiring Cuba. The Doctrine’s construction was, therefore, firmly based in self-interest and this
conclusion is backed up by a host of scholarship. Indeed, John Murrin states that “The zeal for
expansion trumped a willingness to support other republics in the hemisphere. By the 1840s, if not
earlier, the Monroe Doctrine had become a hegemonic text, far more than a statement of republican
principle.”212 Rather than being a statement of republican principle and allyship, the Monroe
Doctrine used the room the United States had to maneuver to its own distinct advantage.
If Monroe had followed American Creedal expectations, he might have engaged in alliances
with these other republican states, not sold weapons to their monarchical enemies, or at the very
least not left so much room in his doctrine for U.S. colonizing action against them. Instead, he
bucked his stated support to these republican states with the structure of his doctrine: both in what
it did and in what it did not do. Jefferson and Madison, prioritizing U.S. interest over the republican
cause and doubting the ability of Latin America to govern itself, wrote to advise Monroe on this
path and so these roads not taken beg the question of why Monroe choose the path he did. What,
exactly, was the purpose of his doctrine and why did it usurp the republican cause?
The Realization of a Dream
While many scholars have connected the self-interested aspects of the Monroe Doctrine to
its purpose, this connection actually runs deeper than self-interest to link with the Virginia Dynasty’s
vision of republicanism itself. Their goal of transforming the United States into an ever-expanding
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“Empire of Liberty” was the central motivator behind the Monroe Doctrine, and for them this goal
was worth sacrificing the republican prospects in Latin America.
The purpose of the doctrine can be traced, in part, to Jefferson and Madison’s questions
concerning Cuba in the replies they sent back to Monroe. Whether or not these questions proved
crucial to Monroe’s decision making, in the end Monroe left a clear opening in his doctrine for the
United States to take Cuba and whatever other American territory it coveted. Indeed, Monroe
himself stated that “we ought if possible to incorporate it [Cuba] into our union.”213 Why did Cuba
feature so prominently in the thoughts of all three actors?
This question has largely been answered by Stephen Chambers in his book No God But Gain.
Chambers writes that “by this time [1808], North Americans had already established a de facto
informal empire on the much closer Spanish island [of Cuba].”214 With its plantations supplying the
world’s coffee and sugar additions, Cuban agro-industry was experiencing rapid growth and
tremendous profit, all of which was dependent on the continuation of the slave trade due to the
brutal labor conditions on the island. Chambers notes that “fully 25 percent (3.2 million) of all the
enslaved Africans to arrive in the Americas were brought after the U.S. ban”215 continuing to say that
“If coffee, sugar and specie unlocked the doors of European and Asian markets for U.S. capitalists,
slave ships were their key. The modern system of global capitalism originated as a machine that ran
on the engine of the slave trade.”216 When Jefferson, Madison, and Monroe, all plantations owners,
looked to Cuba they saw a lucrative system whose economic effects were critical to enabling the
prosperity of the United States. This is why, when Monroe wrote to them, both Jefferson and
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Madison expressed concern over the enshrinement of Cuba’s separation from the U.S. under
Canning’s system.
This Cuban money provided an incredible benefit to the United States: the alleviation of its
debt. Chambers writes that:
The Spanish economist Javier Cuenca Esteban has calculated that from 1790 through 1811
U.S. trade surpluses with Spanish colonies-primarily Cuba-offset 90 per cent of U.S. trade
deficits with the rest of the world, which historian Linda Salvucci has suggested ‘went a long
way toward reducing the international indebtedness of the young United States.’ U.S.
policymakers were well aware that by 1800 the U.S.-Cuba trade and slave trade also
represented a significant portion of total customs receipts, which were the lifeblood of
government revenue.217
U.S. connections to the Cuban slave economy were, therefore, extraordinarily important to its
financial and economic stability. When Monroe remarked in his last address to Congress that the
entirety of the United States’ public debt could be paid off in a decade,218 he did so only because of
the favorable commerce with Cuba and the resulting government revenue. All Monroe’s plans for
construction, fortification, and other government endeavors he outlined were also premised on this
trade with Cuba. Jefferson and Madison’s focus on Cuba makes perfect sense in light of these facts:
the growth of the United States was, in large part, entirely dependent on Cuban slavery.
Chambers goes on to connect this illegal slave trade to the Monroe Doctrine itself. He writes
that:
The doctrine was crafted to protect the illegal slave trade and was entirely consistent with the
existing anti-British pro-slavery foreign policy of the administration. It was, moreover, the
next logical step in the incorporation of the apparatus of U.S. foreign policy into the private
trade networks of elite Americans invested in Cuba….The ‘No Transfer Principle of 1811’
had now become a hemispheric, ‘status quo,’ non-annexation policy writ large.219
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By warning European powers against playing an active role in the Americas, Monroe was
proclaiming Cuba off limits to the ongoing British crusade to end the slave trade.220 This policy
would also protect Brazil’s slave trade and help to insulate American slavery from foreign
interference. This may be why Monroe refused alliances with Latin American states after his 1823
speech; this refusal was part of a broader refusal to work alongside abolitionist actors. If the
Americas were to be separated from Europe, this separation would be maintained by a state with an
active stake in the continuation of slavery, the illicit slave trade, and the profits derived from them.
This reasoning is evidenced by other parts of Monroe’s 1823 address. In that address he
claims that “not one [U.S. ship] so employed [in the slave trade] has been discovered, and there is
good reason to believe that our flag is now seldom, if at all, disgraced by that traffic.”221 Monroe’s
statement only highlights the degree to which his administration and the U.S. government were
uninterested in enforcing the ban on the slave trade. As Chambers points out, it was an open secret
that Senator James D’Wolff was engaged in the illegal slave trade.222 If Monroe had been searching
for U.S. slave ships, he assuredly could have found them. The fact that he did not highlights
Chambers’ point about Monroe’s protection of the Cuban slave economy, passively, through
non-enforcement, and actively, through the Monroe Doctrine.
This protection was also deeply connected to the ongoing project of westward expansion.
The government revenue collected from trade with Cuba allowed for, as Monroe himself suggested,
“the extinguishment of the Indian title to large tracts of fertile territory” and “the acquisition of
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Florida.”223 The money gained from the U.S.-protected Cuban slave economy directly financed
government efforts to expand westward. Chambers also supports this connection, writing that “As
Americans became intimately involved in every aspect of the Cuban slave regime—including the
slave trade—they routed the profits north to back the development of the financial infrastructure of
the United States and fund westward expansion.”224 This was a vicious cycle: U.S. agricultural
surplus was shipped south to feed the Cuban slave population who were brought to the island by
U.S. slavers, Cuban goods and money were then sent North to the United States where they, and the
government revenue they created, helped enable the westward expansion that, in turn, resulted in
more farmland and, therefore, more foodstuffs to send to Cuba. Monroe was not ignorant of this
fact. Chambers notes that in “September 1816 General Jessup, a high-profile officer hailed for his
recent military service, advised soon-to-be president James Monroe that ‘Cuba is, therefore, the key
to all Western America, whether we consider it in a military, a commercial, or a political point of
view.’”225 When Monroe created his doctrine, he did so in full knowledge of the importance of Cuba
to U.S. westward expansion and of the possibility that British anti-slavery efforts might shut down
this economic structure and expansion as a result.
While protecting the Cuban slave-economy was part of how the Monroe Doctrine protected
expansion, it also did so in other ways. Monroe’s non-colonization principle is located directly after
his reference to a proposal by the Russian government for a negotiation of “the respective rights and
interests of the two nations on the North West coast of this continent.”226 Britain, Monroe notes,
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issued a similar request. This structure indicates that the Monroe Doctrine was meant to deter these
governments from further expansion in the North West, thereby leaving more room for the U.S.
Indeed, the connection between the Monroe Doctrine and westward expansion is reinforced later
on in the speech when Monroe directly followed his doctrine of the two different systems by
outlining the “new territory” that had “been acquired of vast extent.”227 He went on to note that “by
enlarging the basis of our system increasing the number of States the system itself has been greatly
strengthened in both its branches. Consolidation and disunion have thereby been rendered equally
impracticable.”228 The Monroe Doctrine was not only connected to the project of westward
expansion but, through this, to the internal cohesion and stability of the United States.
Stephen Chambers’ analysis is extraordinarily useful, but it misses the depth to which the
self-interested nature of the Monroe doctrine is connected to the project of the United States itself.
While his portrayal of the “incorporation of the apparatus of U.S. foreign policy into the private
trade networks of elite Americans invested in Cuba”229 is accurate, it fails to grasp the connection
between the Monroe Doctrine and the ongoing project of the Virginia plantation class and its
governing dynasty: Jefferson, Madison, and Monroe.
Properly understood, the Monroe Doctrine represented a distinct turn away from the
ideology of extra-national republican growth. With the post 1815 stability and Canning’s proposal,
Monroe saw an opportunity for the U.S. to take proactive and decisive action abroad but rather than
leverage this moment to aid in the spread of representative government, he turned the energy the
U.S. government previously spent on survival toward the longstanding Jeffersonian project of
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westward expansion. Jefferson imagined a sprawling agrarian republic and Monroe, having
negotiated the Louisiana Purchase and attempted to negotiate the sale of Florida, had been
instrumental in enacting that vision even before his presidency. John Murrin writes that Jefferson’s
project centered around “indefinite continental expansionism….hegemony for the United States at
least in North America, and perhaps in the whole western hemisphere, and a determination to
accomplish these goals without building a centralized warmaking government.”230 Murrin calls this
vision both “Jefferson’s Lebensraum” and his “Malthusian diplomacy” going on to state that Jefferson
“assumed that the new republic’s unlimited supply of food would make possible a maximum rate of
expansion for the indefinite future and eventually take over Spain’s possessions.”231 Murrin then
quotes Jefferson: “We should take care not to think it for the interest of that great continent to press
too soon on the Spaniards. Those countries cannot be in better hands. My fear is that they are too
feeble to hold them till our population can be sufficiently advanced to take it from them peice by
peice.”232
Jefferson’s vision for the United States was characterized by constant expansion, even into
Latin America. The prospect of Latin American representative government held no sway in his mind
because, to him, it simultaneously hindered his expansionist vision and was secondary to it. Indeed,
Monroe’s statement directly after his doctrine that “Consolidation and disunion have thereby
[through the addition of new states] been rendered equally impracticable” fits neatly into Jefferson’s
expansionist project. Monroe saw the stability of the United States as directly tied to its expansion.
This was also Madison’s view, whose constitutional design was famously premised on the viability
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and advantage of a large republic which, in hindsight, could easily be read as an argument for
expansion.
There was an even more insidious side to this project. Writing to Monroe in 1801, Jefferson
declared that “it is impossible not to look forward to distant times, when our rapid multiplication
will expand itself beyond those limits, & cover the whole northern, if not the southern, continent,
with a people speaking the same language, governed in similar forms, & by similar laws; nore can we
contemplate with satisfaction either blot or mixture on that surface.”233 The “Empire of Liberty”
Jefferson envisioned was not only characterized by constant expansion, but also by complete
uniformity, including racial uniformity. Jefferson’s language of dissatisfaction with a “mixture on
that surface” subtextually alludes to concepts of racial mixture and “blot” points to a darker spot on
an otherwise lighter whole. These cues further highlight why Monroe avoided alliances with Latin
American states and why Madison treated Latin American republics so differently from European
ones: there was no room for abolitionist and non-white republics on the hemisphere these
individuals considered theirs. Murrin notes this when he writes that “The ‘Empire for liberty’ was
for whites only. The twin goals of Indian removal and African colonization were essentially
components of the project, at least in Jefferson’s imagination.”234 Indeed, Jefferson, Madison, and
Monroe all supported African colonization and oversaw the large-scale removal of Native peoples
from their land. The expansionist republic of the Virginia Dynasty was meant to be white,
English-speaking, and politically uniform.
These three ‘founding fathers’ stood united in their vision of this pure expansionist republic
and they had a cumulative twenty four years in the presidency to realize their dream. Jefferson
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bought the Louisiana Purchase with Monroe’s diplomatic assistance and the revolutions in Latin
America created an opportunity for United States’ commercial and territorial expansion, but the War
of 1812 put a halt to such considerations. After the war, the United States gained a stability that
neither Jefferson nor, for the most part, Madison had the opportunity to take advantage of. Luckily
their fellow Virginian, Monroe, succeeded Madison and was in place to continue to enact their
collective vision with the benefit of stability. Monroe was waiting for an opening from which he
could accelerate this enactment, in the same way Jefferson had with the Louisiana Purchase, and
form his own legacy. So when Canning made his proposal, the opening presented itself. After this
sign of British acceptance of the exclusion of European powers from the Americas, Monroe forged
his own path and declared the Western Hemisphere off limits to European colonization and
interference, thereby protecting the slave-based Cuban economic engine fueling western expansion
while simultaneously acting to prevent European expansion from colliding with that of the United
States.
The Monroe Doctrine was a leap forward in a project that these individuals, and the Virginia
plantation class more broadly, had been advancing since before independence. The Seven Years War
began, in large part, because of the westward expansion of Virginia land speculators235 into Native
American territory. The actions of these speculators sparked a world war which, in turn, led Britain
to restrict westward expansion with the Proclamation Line of 1763.236 Thirteen years later due in
large part to the restrictions of this line, the colonies revolted, declared their independence, and
established the United States whose mythology of freedom and governing framework would be
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created, in large part, by Thomas Jefferson and James Madison respectively. After Washington and
Adams’ presidencies, these individuals finally controlled the government they had built and set about
enacting their republican vision. Despite setbacks, in 1823 Monroe put forward his doctrine to make
the Virginia Dynasty’s vision for eventual hemispheric domination by the ‘pure’ republican United
States a reality. This doctrine would live on throughout the rest of the country’s history, enabling the
use of republican rhetoric to justify intervention, expansion, and genocide exactly as intended.
While the American Creedal narrative can excuse away certain aspects of the founders as
‘imperfections’ in an otherwise righteous vision for the expansion of freedom, it cannot hold up to
the reality that these ‘perfect’ political ideals were themselves deeply imperfect. The thoughts of
Jefferson, Madison, and Monroe on representative government, the heart of the American creed,
were profoundly shaped by the self-interest of the United States and the expansionist and genocidal
vision they sought to enact. They used the principle of representative government to justify aspects
of their project, including the exclusion of European influence in the Monroe Doctrine, but this
principle was never the compass for their actions. It was not that their greed, expansionism, and
disregard for representative government outside the U.S. were aberrations from an otherwise
admirable republican philosophy, but instead these ‘aberrations’ were integral to their core vision of
representative government and its future. Furthermore, whenever they had the possibility to act,
these individuals chose to abandon their “sister republics”237 for this self-interested vision. When
Jefferson, Madison, and Monroe looked southward, they saw an opportunity for representative
government so long as it was theirs.
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Conclusion-The Presence in the Past
“A Klee painting named ‘Angelus Novus’ shows an angel looking as though he is about to move away from
something he is fixedly contemplating. His eyes are staring, his mouth is open, his wings are spread. This is how one
pictures the angel of history. His face is turned toward the past. Where we perceive a chain of events, he sees one single
catastrophe which keeps piling wreckage upon wreckage and hurls it in front of his feet. The angel would like to stay,
awaken the dead, and make whole what has been smashed. But a storm is blowing from Paradise; it has got caught in
his wings with such violence that the angel can no longer close them. This storm irresistibly propels him into the future
to which his back is turned, while the pile of debris before him grows skyward. This storm is what we call progress.”238
Walter Benjamin writes that to the angel of history, the past is not a chain of events, but
rather one single catastrophe. Trouillot’s suggestion, that rather than just new facts we need a new
narrative, is a call to open our eyes to this catastrophe. The American creedal narrative is “the storm
[that] we call progress.” It says the United States has been on the path of improvement, striving to
live up to its ‘founding ideals,’ and pulls us into the future. But the history of the United States is not
a chain of events in which the harms of the past are separable from these ideals. Rather, it is a
catastrophe that stretches back before independence, the roots of which are integral to
republicanism itself.
This integral relationship is core to what the previous chapters have attempted to
demonstrate. When historians and political scientists separate the ‘founding’ of the United States
from the ensuing history, especially the period during which the founders governed, they limit
themselves to a partial view of republicanism. In order to gain a fuller view, the lens of investigation
must be widened to encompass the years after the founding in which the meaning of republicanism
was extrapolated. The views of Jefferson and Madison on Latin America, and their further
incarnation in the Monroe Doctrine, were a part of the continuing codification of founding

Walter Benjamin, “Theses on the Philosophy of History,” in Illuminations, ed. Hannah Arendt, trans. Harry Zohn,
(New York: Schocken Books, 1968), 257-258.
238

95
republicanism. Just as the protection of slavery and expansionism were core to the Monroe
Doctrine, so too were they core to the founders’ republican vision. When they looked south, they
saw a population whose struggle toward republicanism was not worthy of assistance, especially not
at the cost of their domestic vision. Given the opportunity to enact the kind of universalist
republican change the American creedal narrative would expect, these figures not only abandoned
that action but declared their abandonment ‘for the sake of Republicanism itself.’ By the founders’
own admission this was not a divergence from the United States’ principles but was in accordance
with the real founding principles of the United States which they leave unsaid: expansionism and
greed.
This evidence demands a reinterpretation of what ‘republicanism’ meant for these ‘founding
fathers’ and, through them, what it means as a foundation for the United States. Doctrinal
republicanism, the republicanism of the American creedal narrative, is characterized both by
universalism, the idea that the U.S. was an example of a republicanism that could spread throughout
the world, and by the juxtaposition between the public good and self-interest. This is why Gordon
Wood in “Interests and Disinterestedness” notes the volatile nature of being labeled as an
‘interested’ politician: to be interested was akin to not being a devout republican.239 The validity of
this universalism and this public good/self-interest juxtaposition as central tenets to founding
republicanism falls away when the scope of investigation is widened to the early republic and
republicanism as a theory and practice of rule is taken seriously. What emerges from this
investigation is an image of the United States as less of an exemplar “city on a hill”240 and more of a
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chosen people in a quasi-theological sense. To the founders, as the ‘first republic’ the interest of the
United States maintained hierarchical dominance in their definition of republicanism. Representative
government could spread to Latin America, but the principle of republicanism would only apply if
this spread was consistent with the perceived interests of the United States which, in most cases,
involved slavery and territorial expansion.
We see this pattern not only in their language, but in their actions. As Haiti revolted and
became a free republic, this revolution troubled the slave-based interests of United States and so the
revolution was condemned and its republican connection was denied.241,242 However, when Madison
was annexing West Florida he not only saw his actions as in accordance with republicanism, but
manipulated the situation so that the self-determination based republican justification for U.S.
annexation was more prominent.243
U.S. republicanism cannot be characterized by the dichotomy between self-interest and the
public good. While this dichotomy may have structured domestic U.S. politics as Wood outlines,
globally the founders saw the republican public good and the self-interest of the United States as
essentially the same. Anything that promoted the expansion and through this the interest of the ‘first
republic’ was justified as republican in nature. The U.S. was a “city on a hill” not in the sense that
others would eventually ascend to its level, but in the sense that it was ‘a city above all other cities.’
To the founders, the U.S. and the white citizens who inhabited it were a chosen people and this gave
them supremacy over other republican populations. It was not that other places could not become
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republican, but that they would always be less republican than the U.S., especially if they were not
white. Rather than being an independent ideal with its own definition of good, the core idea of
founding republicanism was that the U.S. good was equitable to the republican good. The American
creedal narrative uses republican ideals to justify U.S. exceptionalism but this is mistaken: the
founders’ notion of the U.S. as exceptional is exactly what makes it unexceptional.
This self-centered worldview directly contributed to the catastrophe of U.S. history. The
Monroe Doctrine was the culmination of the Virginia Dynasty’s project, combining ‘principled
rhetoric’ with the expansionist reality of those principles. However, Monroe and the United States
were still limited by the realities of their time. While powerful, the United States was still a new
country, lacking the capability to fully realize its interventionist and expansionist potential. What is
significant about this history is that it set up a culture of expansionism and growth rooted in the
belief that because the republican good was defined by U.S. interest, furthering this interest was
always principally just. The Virginia Dynasty never travelled West, living on the coast and returning
to Europe rather than venturing deeper into the American continent. When Jefferson envisioned the
future of the United States, he saw a country of small-scale agrarianism rather than rampaging
finance, burgeoning capitalism, and the Cotton Kingdom. He and his compatriots might not have
foreseen this world, but we should not mistake their hand in creating it.
Given this creation, at the level of ideas the divide between the ‘founding fathers’ and the
post-Jacksonian U.S. is probably smaller than most historians believe. Jackson and the presidents
that followed were more strongly oriented Westward, but their vision was not restricted to small
scale agrarianism and so Manifest Destiny became the United States' governing dynamic. When Polk
re-articulated the Monroe Doctrine and called for further expansion culminating in the Mexican
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American war and the annexation of the North-American West,244 he did so using the tools the
founders had left for him. At this point historians acknowledge that the Monroe Doctrine was one
of these tools, created with expansionist openings and ambitions, but republicanism was another. It
defined the principled lens which the U.S. government would use to justify its power and through
which the U.S. populace would come see themselves. These trends were made viable in part by the
centrality of expansionism and racial prejudice to the republican philosophy. Jefferson, Madison, and
Monroe may not have had the opportunity to annex the far-west, intervene in Cuba, nor dictate
politics in central-America, but the republican ideology they created was there for the leaders with
those opportunities.
Seen from this perspective, the foundations that guide U.S. hegemonic power extend farther
back than many presume. The pre-independence Virginian project of westward expansion guided
the republican principles that would be harnessed by the Monroe Doctrine and future U.S. leaders.
U.S. hegemony was not a diversion from the founding ideals, but was completely in line with these
ideals as they were further defined by the founders during their years in office and subsequent
correspondence. The legacy of this dynamic is visible even in this century, especially with President
Bush’s democratic justification for the 2003 invasion of Iraq. With the end of the frontier, these
principled tools now justify U.S. action on a global scale.245 The exact course of history might differ
from the vision of the founders, but it was a history built using their principled mechanisms.
This is no chain of events, it is a single catastrophe. With republicanism at its beck and call,
the expansionist engine fueled the radical growth of Cotton Kingdom slavery in the south and the
genocide of Native peoples to the west, the legacies of which still haunt the present. Next, the
244

James Polk, First Annual Address, 2 December 1845, The American Presidency Project, accessed 22 April 2018,
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=29486.
245
Jackson Lears, Rebirth of a Nation: The Making of Modern America 1877-1920 (New York: Harper Perennial, 2009).

99
United States engaged in near constant intervention in Latin America, eventually intervening in other
hemispheres, but always drawing on the same republican ideology. These were not diversions from
the creedal path of progress, they were actions built upon the legacy of the founding, a legacy
constructed to enable this type of action. Benjamin writes that “there is no document of civilization
which is not at the same time a document of barbarism. And just as such a document is not free of
barbarism, barbarism taints also the manner in which it was transmitted from one owner to
another.”246 The creedal narrative sees only the barbarism of transmission, remaining blind to the
barbarism of the document. In fact they are one and the same.
This is only one new story, meant to challenge the creedal narrative that has become a kind
of U.S. mythology. I am open to the possibility that this narrative might be wrong, though its core
elements feel well founded. I am certain that the complexities of its full articulation have been
missed in this project and the work of others will and already has begun filling in the gaps of this
new story. Even as this vital work goes on, the American creedal narrative remains a key element in
United States history, both in education and scholarship. In this position, the creedal narrative
reinforces silences. It is imperative that we look through these silences, not only to deconstruct them
as Trouillot does, but to weave a new history.
There are many obstacles to this task, the first of which pertains to the archive itself.
Trouillot’s analysis about the bias of the archive is well taken, but there are also basic problems with
accessibility. Jefferson and Madison’s collected writings have been sorted by the Library of
Congress, but no such work has been done for Monroe despite his importance. The more accessible
these archives become, the less historians will forced to content ourselves with the ‘famous’ letters
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and addresses. This will allow other writings to be investigated and leveraged against those more
accessible sources the creedal narrative has deemed important. If it structures the archive, as I am
sure it does, the archive must be broadened not only to bring in a greater diversity of historical
voices, but to challenge the creedal narrative itself. Finding additional, and more critical, analytical
angles on powerful historical figures is one way to do this.
Furthermore, the investigative lens has to shift to better encompass private correspondence.
Today we are increasingly aware of the informal mechanisms through which power, and the elite
that wield it, operate. Jefferson’s retirement letters to Monroe do not seem core to the republican
ideology, but that is only because the creedal narrative says they are not. Jefferson’s words echoed
even then with the authority of his position in history. Given that Jefferson helped found the United
States with certain words, all his other words must be taken seriously as shedding light on the
meaning of this founding. This project has shown the kind of perspective this light can reveal.
At a deeper level, however, this historiographic silencing may be attributed to the artificial
distinction between thought and action. Not only does the creedal narrative separate the founding
from what came after it, but in doing so it draws this thought/action distinction. The
thought-foundation of the U.S. remains moral despite the immoral actions of its thinkers. This is a
distinction created by the creedal narrative for its own benefit. Jefferson, Madison, and Monroe
presided over a republic they helped found; we should, therefore, take the periods of their
governance as extended evidence of their founding vision. For example, Madison’s writing about the
viability and advantage of large republics has become important to the literature on the founding
and the U.S. political system. What this project reveals is that during and after his time in office,
Madison concentrated on the expansion of the United States, making an already large republic even
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larger. Perhaps, rather than a case for a large republic, Madison’s original argument was already
looking forward to the expansion he and his Virginian companions would enable. Beginning to take
the later thoughts and actions of the founders seriously, scholars can gain a new perspective on the
original conception of the United States. Founding a country is not simply about establishing
mechanisms of government, but is largely about creating a justification for the founding itself. The
mythological history emerging from this justificatory moment must be juxtaposed and synthesized
with what came afterwards.
However, after these texts are uncovered and analyzed they cannot be pushed aside as an
imperfection in an otherwise pure vision. To challenge the creedal narrative, the immoral aspects of
history must be connected into a coherent whole. The racial vision of the Virginia dynasty was not
separate from their expansionist aims nor their self-righteous perspectives; these all wound together
in a twenty four year period during which time they influenced policy and cemented what U.S.
governing norms would be. The creedal narrative succeeds by connecting certain dots while denying
the connections of others. Better efforts must be made to fold morally questionable and
uncomfortable elements of history back into the general narrative because it was through these
immoral means that this general narrative was created.
Additionally, silences must be sought out. The tricky thing about silences is that they go
unnoticed if not searched for. Indeed, I only arrived at this project’s analysis of slavery after my
advisor told me to look into the silences, to look into what Jefferson was not saying. One silence led
me to another, and another. We have a duty to actively search for silences: to not let the archive
restrict our thoughts, to keep in mind actions not taken in addition to those that were, and to always
interrogate power where we find it.
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To interrogate this power, we must not be afraid to judge those who wielded it. Walter
Benjamin’s concept of “awakening the dead” is important, but in order for these awakened figures
to hold their proper weight in history we must not only highlight the wrongs of the powerful, but
also judge these wrongs and their enactors. Only when Thomas Jefferson is a greedy bastard can we
fully reveal the self-interested nature of his republicanism and deconstruct its role in structuring our
present society. The historian’s reticence surrounding judgement is understandable because for years
their judgements worked to the benefit of power, oftentimes they still do. The problem with this
reticence is that today it leaves the old constructed biases intact by toning down the histories that
challenge these biases and the power they were built upon. As a discipline we should always be wary
of how our judgements may play into biases and power structures, but our fear of this should not
cripple us from making right the harms of the past, as historians and as citizens.
Indeed, this work is more urgent than ever before. Trouillot writes that “we move closer to
the era when professional historians will have to position themselves more clearly within the present,
lest politicians, magnates, or ethic leaders alone write history for them.”247 This sentiment echoes
Benjamin, who wrote that “For every image of the past that is not recognized by the present as one
of its own concerns threatens to disappear irretrievably.”248 The mythology of the creedal narrative
continues to apologize for the catastrophe of U.S. history, with all its inequalities and oppressions.
In this moment, an image of the past shows itself as a concern of the present, the silences become
ever so slightly audible, and it is our duty to form this history lest, once again, it disappears. Arendt
writes that “no moral, individual and personal, standards of conduct will ever be able to excuse us
from collective responsibility. This vicarious responsibility for things we have not done, this taking
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upon ourselves the consequences for things we are entirely innocent of, is the price we pay for the
fact that we live our lives not by ourselves but among our fellowmen.”249 To ignore this history, to
continue to write about the ‘founding ideals’ is not only to deny history, it is to deny our
responsibility for that history. We might not have penned the words that justified genocide and
expansionism, but we live in the world those words created and we have a responsibility to remedy
the crimes of their past authors and present adherents. To enact this remedy, we must first
acknowledge these crimes and their centrality to our political community. The American creedal
narrative does more than silence, it excuses: asking ‘Why should we be responsible for the failure of
our ancestors to live up to the ideals that we uphold?’ and declaring that ‘the core vision for our
country has always been one of admirable principles.’ With these excuses the storm blows down
from paradise and progress, the notion that U.S. history is one of slow but inevitable improvement,
blinds us to the catastrophe of our history. This storm can make us feel comfortable, its illusion
guarding us from the uncomfortable truth that we hold a collective responsibility for this
catastrophe, but this illusion does nothing for all those who suffer because of our history nor does it
remove from us our responsibility to these persons. Each day we live under this illusion we
condemn its victims to further suffering and condemn ourselves as members of the community it
founded.
This responsibility is core to our duty to always remember the presence in the past. I say
presence because we need to remember both that the present holds its roots in the past and that the
past has a presence today. In essence, we need to remember, as Benjamin claimed, that linear time is
itself silencing because time flows both ways, weaving together the past and the present. Part of
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acknowledging this means challenging the historically based myths and illusions that reside in this
confluence of past and present. To do so is not to engage in Ranke’s project to show the past “as it
essentially was,”250 because a historian’s duty exists not to the past as a “separate world,”251 but to
the presence in the past. This demands not simply a search for the truth, but a search for a truth that
can serve the present by combatting silences, awakening the dead, and reevaluating the history of the
powerful. Historians must take a greater stand on what their histories mean in order to challenge our
readers to rethink the present in addition to the past. We are, and will forever remain, political
actors. A lack of judgement or moral condemnation and an ignorance of this confluence of time are
acts as political as their opposites. Whether we recognize it or not, the presence in the past will
always be with us. We have a responsibility to make it just.
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